INTRODUCTION
An important target of the analysis of algorithms is to determine whether there exist practical schemes, which enjoy mathematical guarantees on performance.
Hashing and hash tables are some of the most common inner loops in real-world computation, and are even built-in "unit cost" operations in high level programming languages that offer associative arrays. Often, these inner loops dominate the overall computation time. Knuth [1963] gave birth to the analysis of algorithms when he analyzed linear probing, a very popular practical implementation of hash tables (mathematicians have been challenged by the complexity of simple procedures for much longer, for example, Collaz' famous "3n + 1" termination conjecture from 1937). Assuming a perfectly random hash function, Knuth bounded the expected number of probes. However, we do not have perfectly random hash functions. The approach of algorithms analysis is to understand when simple and practical hash functions work well. The very fast multiplication-shift based hashing schemes [Dietzfelbinger 1996; Dietzfelbinger et al. 1997 ] maintain the O(1) running times when the sequence of operations has sufficient randomness [Mitzenmacher and Vadhan 2008] . However, they fail badly even for very simple input structures like an interval of consecutive keys [Pǎtraşcu and Thorup 2010; Thorup and Zhang 2012] , giving linear probing an undeserved reputation of being non-robust.
On the other hand, the approach of algorithm design (which may still have a strong element of analysis) is to construct (more complicated) hash functions providing the desired mathematical properties. This is usually done in the influential k-independence paradigm of Wegman and Carter [1981] : a family H = {h : [u] → [m]} of hash functions is k-independent if for any distinct x 1 , . . . , x k ∈ [u], and uniformly random h ∈ H, the hash codes h(x 1 ), . . . , h(x k ) are independent random variables, and the hash code of any fixed x is uniformly distributed in [m] .
It is known that 5-independence is sufficient [Pagh et al. 2009 ] and necessary (some 4-independent schemes do not work) [Pǎtraşcu and Thorup 2010] for linear probing. Then one can use the fastest available implementation of 5-independent hash functions [Thorup and Zhang 2012] .
Here we analyze simple tabulation hashing. The hash codes are bit-strings of some prespecified length, for example, 32 or 64 bits. This scheme views a key x as a vector of c characters x 1 , . . . , x c . For each character position, we initialize a totally random table H i of hash codes, and then use the hash function
(1)
Here ⊕ denotes bit-wise exclusive-or. This is a well-known scheme dating back at least to Zobrist [1970] . For him a character position corresponded to a position on a game board, and the character was the piece at the position. From a practical view-point, the tables H i can be small enough to fit in fast cache, and the function is probably the easiest to implement beyond the bare multiplication. Eq.
(1) can also be thought of as a recurrence where the H i may be arbitrary hash functions. As pointed out in Wegman and Carter [1981] , if each H i is 2-independent (or 3-independent), then so is h. Here we study the properties of h when each H i is totally random. The resulting h is only 3-independent, and was therefore assumed to have weak mathematical properties. However, here we show that the randomness inside the H i provides strong mathematical guarantees when h is used in some important applications like linear probing.
We note that if we work with n keys from a very large universe U, we typically first do a universe reduction, applying a universal hash function [Carter and Wegman 1979 ] from U to [u] where u = n O(1) . Thus, when we apply simple tabulation, we assume u = n O(1) . Then for any constant ε > 0, we can pick c = O(1) such that the character tables fit in O(n ε ) space. In our experiments, we use 8-bit characters, for example, c = 8 for 64-bit keys.
We will use = [u 1/c ] to denote the alphabet of the characters. As a slight abuse of notation, we shall sometimes use instead of | | to denote the size of the alphabet when the context makes this meaning clear (we note that this accidentally matches the classic set-theoretic recursive definition of a natural as the set of smaller naturals). We shall refer to the tables H i as the "character tables" and lookups in these tables as "character lookups". The basic assumption is that the character tables fit in cache so that character lookups are very fast-much faster than a general memory lookup.
The challenge in analyzing simple tabulation is the significant dependence between keys. Nevertheless, we show that the scheme works in some of the most important randomized algorithms, including linear probing and several instances when (lg n)-independence was previously needed. We confirm our findings by experiments: simple tabulation is competitive in speed with two multiplications, and the hidden constants in the analysis appear to be very acceptable in practice.
In many cases, our analysis gives the first provably good implementation of an algorithm which matches the algorithm's conceptual simplicity if one ignores hashing.
Desirable Properties. We will focus on the following popular properties of truly random hash functions.
-The worst-case query time of chaining is O(lg n/ lg lg n) with high probability (w.h.p.). More generally, when distributing balls into bins, the bin load obeys Chernoff bounds. -Linear probing runs in expected O(1) time per operation [Knuth 1963 ]. Variance and all constant moments are also O(1). -Cuckoo hashing [Pagh and Rodler 2004] : Given two tables of size m ≥ (1 + ε)n and a random location for each ball in each table, it is possible to place every ball in one of its locations without any collision, with probability 1 − O( 1 n ). -Given two sets A , B, we have Pr h [min h( A) = min h(B)] = | A∩B| | A∪B| . This can be used to quickly estimate the intersection of two sets, and follows from a property called minwise independence [Broder et al. 2000 ]: for any x / ∈ S, Pr h [h(x) < min h(S)] = 1 |S|+1 .
As indicated previously, we will use the terms "balls" and "keys" interchangeably. In the combinatorial view, we throw balls into random bins without details on the structure of the set of balls or the set of bins. When it comes to hash tables with concrete hash functions from balls to bins, we sometimes need to talk more about the domain that the balls are coming from, and then we will often refer to them as 'keys' in the computer science view.
Chernoff bounds continue to work with high enough independence [Schmidt et al. 1995] ; for instance, independence lg n lg lg n suffices for the bound on the maximum bin load. For linear probing, 5-independence is sufficient [Pagh et al. 2009 ] and necessary [Pǎtraşcu and Thorup 2010] . For cuckoo hashing, O(lg n)-independence suffices and at least 6-independence is needed [Cohen and Kane 2009] . While minwise independence cannot be achieved, one can achieve ε-minwise independence with the guarantee (∀)x / ∈ S, Pr h [x < min h(S)] = 1±ε |S|+1 . For this, lg 1 ε independence is sufficient [Indyk 2001 ] and necessary [Pǎtraşcu and Thorup 2010] . (Note that the ε is a bias so it is a lower bound on how well set intersection can be approximated, with any number of independent experiments.)
The canonical construction of k-independent hash functions is a random degree k − 1 polynomial in a prime field, which has small representation but (k) evaluation time. Competitive implementations of polynomial hashing simulate arithmetic modulo Mersenne primes via bitwise operations. Even so, tabulation-based hashing with O(u 1/c ) space and O(ck) evaluation time is significantly faster [Thorup and Zhang 2012] . The linear dependence on k is problematic, for example, when k ≈ lg n. Siegel [2004] shows that a family with superconstant independence but O(1) evaluation time requires (u ε ) space, i.e. it requires tabulation. He also gives a solution that uses O(u 1/c ) space, c O(c) evaluation time, and achieves u (1/c 2 ) independence (which is superlogarithmic, at least asymptotically). The construction is non-uniform, assuming a certain small expander which gets used in a graph product. Dietzfelbinger and Rink [2009] use universe splitting to obtain similar high independence with some quite different costs. Instead of being highly independent on the whole universe, their goal is to be highly independent on an unknown but fixed set S of size n. For some constant parameter γ , they tolerate an error probability of n −γ . Assuming no error, their hash function is highly independent on S. The evaluation time is constant and the space is sublinear. For error probability n −γ , each hash computation calls O(γ ) subroutines, each of which evaluates its own degree O(γ ) polynomial. The price for a lower error tolerance is therefore a slower hash function (even if we only count it as constant time in theory).
While polynomial hashing may perform better than its independence suggests, we have no positive example yet. On the tabulation front, we have one example of a good hash function that is not formally k-independent: cuckoo hashing works with an ad hoc hash function that combines space O(n 1/c ) and polynomials of degree O(c) [Dietzfelbinger and Woelfel 2003 ].
Our Results
Here we provide an analysis of simple tabulation showing that it has many of these desirable properties previously. For most of our applications, we want to rule out certain obstructions with high probability. This follows immediately if certain events are independent, and the algorithms design approach is to pick a hash function guaranteeing this independence, usually in terms of a highly independent hash function.
Instead we here stick with simple tabulation with all its dependencies. This means that we have to struggle in each individual application to show that the dependencies are not fatal. However, from an implementation perspective, this is very attractive, leaving us with one simple and fast scheme for (almost) all our needs.
Since the hash codes of simple tabulation are bit strings, when we hash into bins, the number of bins is generally understood to be a power of two. In all our results, we assume the number c = O(1) of characters is constant. The constants in our bounds will depend on c. Our results use a rather diverse set of techniques analyzing the table dependencies in different types of problems. For chaining and linear probing, we rely on some concentration results, which will also be used as a starting point for the analysis of min-wise hashing. Theoretically, the most interesting part is the analysis for cuckoo hashing with a very intricate study of a random bipartite graph induced by the two hash functions.
Chernoff Bounds. We first show that simple tabulation preserves some Chernofftype concentration. THEOREM 1.1. Consider hashing n balls into m ≥ n 1−1/(2c) bins by simple tabulation (recall that c = O(1) is the number of characters). Let q be an additional query ball, and define X q as the number of regular balls that hash into a bin chosen as a function of h (q) . Let μ = E[X q ] = n m . The following probability bounds hold for any constant γ :
With m ≤ n bins, every bin gets n/m ± O n/mlog c n .
balls with probability 1 − n −γ .
Contrasting standard Chernoff bounds (see, e.g., Motwani and Raghavan [1995] ), Theorem 1.1 (2) and (3) only provides polynomially small probability, i.e. at least m −γ for any desired constant γ . In addition, the exponential dependence on μ in (2) and (3) is reduced by a constant which depends (exponentially) on the constants γ and c. It is possible to get some super polynomially small bounds with super constant γ but they are not as clean. An alternative way to understand the bound is that our tail bound depends exponentially on εμ, where ε decays to subconstant as we move more than inversely polynomial out in the tail. Thus, our bounds are sufficient for any polynomially high probability guarantee. However, compared to the standard Chernoff bound, we would have to tolerate a constant factor more balls in a bin to get the same failure probability.
The union bound (2) implies that with m = (n) bins, no bin receives more than O(lg n/ lg lg n) balls with high probability This is the first realistic hash function to achieve this fundamental property. Similarly, for linear probing with fill bounded below 1, (3) shows that the longest filled interval is of length O(log n) with high probability.
Linear Probing. Building on these concentration bounds, we show that, if the table size is m = (1 + ε)n, then the expected time per operation is O(1/ε 2 ), which asymptotically matches the bound of Knuth [1963] for a truly random hash function. In particular, this compares positively with the O(1/ε 13/6 ) bound of [Pagh et al. 2009 ] for 5-independent hashing.
Our proof is a combinatorial reduction that relates the performance of linear probing to concentration bounds. The results hold for any hash function with concentration similar to Theorem 1.1. To illustrate the generality of the approach, we also improve the O(1/ε 13/6 ) bound of Pagh et al. [2009] for 5-independent hashing to the optimal O(1/ε 2 ). This was raised as an open problem in Pagh et al. [2009] .
For simple tabulation, we get quite strong concentration results for the time per operation, for example, constant variance for constant ε. For contrast, with 5independent hashing, the variance is only known to be O(log n) [Pagh et al. 2009; Thorup and Zhang 2012] .
Cuckoo Hashing. In cuckoo hashing [Pagh and Rodler 2004] , we use two tables of size m ≥ (1 + ε)n and independent hash functions h 0 and h 1 mapping the keys to these two tables. Cuckoo hashing succeeds if we can place every key in one of its two hash locations without any collision. We can think of this as a bipartite graph with a set for each table and an edge (h 0 (x), h 1 (x)) for each key x. Cuckoo hashing fails exactly if this graph has a component with more edges than vertices. With truly random hashing, this bad event happens with probability ( 1 n ). Here we study the random graphs induced by simple tabulation, and obtain a rather unintuitive result: the worst failure probability is inversely proportional to the cube root of the set size. THEOREM 1.2. Any set of n keys can be placed in two table of size m = (1 + ε) by cuckoo hashing and simple tabulation with probability 1 − O(n −1/3 ). There exist sets on which the failure probability is (n −1/3 ).
Thus, cuckoo hashing with simple tabulation is an excellent construction for a static dictionary. The dictionary can be built (in linear time) after trying O(1) independent hash functions with high probability, and later every query runs in constant worst-case time with two probes. We note that even though cuckoo hashing requires two independent hash functions, these essentially come for the cost of one in simple tabulation: the pair of hash codes can be stored consecutively, in the same cache line, making the running time comparable with evaluating just one hash function.
In the dynamic case, Theorem 1.2 implies that we expect (n 4/3 ) updates between failures requiring a complete rehash with new hash functions.
Our proof involves a complex understanding of the intricate, yet not fatal dependencies in simple tabulation. The proof is a (complicated) algorithm that assumes that cuckoo hashing has failed, and uses this knowledge to compress the random tables H 1 , . . . , H c below the entropy lower bound.
Using our techniques, it is also possible to show that if n balls are placed in O(n) bins in an online fashion, choosing the least loaded bin at each time, the maximum load is O(lg lg n) in expectation [Azar et al. 1999] .
Minwise Independence. We will show that simple tabulation is ε-minwise independent, for a vanishingly small ε (inversely polynomial in the set size). This would require (log n) independence by standard techniques. THEOREM 1.3. Consider a set S of n = |S| keys and q / ∈ S. Then with h implemented by simple tabulation:
This can be used to estimate the size of set intersection by estimating:
For better bounds on the probabilities, we would make multiple experiments with independent hash functions, yet this cannot eliminate the bias ε.
Fourth Moment
Bounds. An alternative to Chernoff bounds in proving good concentration is to use bounded moments. We will analyze the 4th moment of a bin's size when balls are placed into bins by simple tabulation. For a fixed bin, we show that the 4th moment comes extremely close to that achieved by truly random or 4-independent hashing: it deviates by a factor of 1 + O(4 c /m) = 1 + O(1/m). This limited 4th moment for a given bin was discovered independently by Braverman et al. [2010] .
If we have a designated query ball q, and we are interested in the size of a bin chosen as a function of h(q), the 4th moment of simple tabulation is within a constant factor of that achieved by truly random hashing (on close inspection of the proof, that constant is at most 2). This would require 5-independence by standard techniques. (See Pǎtraşcu and Thorup [2010] for a proof that 4-independence can fail quite badly when we want to bound the size of the bin in which q lands.) Our proof exploits an intriguing phenomenon that we identify in simple tabulation: in any fixed set of 5 keys, one of them has a hash code that is independent of the other four's hash codes.
Unlike our Chernoff-type bounds, the constants in the 4th moment bounds can be analyzed quite easily, and are rather tame. Compelling applications of 4th moment bounds are given by Alon et al. [1999] , Karloff and Raghavan [1993] , and Pagh et al. [2009] . In Karloff and Raghavan [1993] , it was shown that any hash function with a good 4th moment bound suffices for a nonrecursive version of quicksort, routing on the hypercube, etc. In Alon et al. [1999] , a limited 4th moment is used to estimate the 2nd moment of a data stream. In Pagh et al. [2009] , limited 4th moment is shown to imply constant expected performance for linear probing. The applications in Karloff and Raghavan [1993] and Pagh et al. [2009] both require dependence of a query bin.
We will also use 4th moment bounds to attain certain bounds of linear probing not covered by our Chernoff-type bounds. In the case of small load factor α = n m = o(1), we use the 4th moment bounds to show that the probability of a full hash location is O(α).
Distributional, not Cryptographic. We emphasize that all the properties we obtain are of a distributional nature. Simple tabulation would not work well cryptographically since knowing some selected hash codes allow to derive others. The simple example is the same as the one used to show that simple tabulation is not 4-independent. Given 4 keys (a 0 , b 0 ), (a 1 , b 0 ), (a 0 , b 1 ), (a 1 , b 1 ), no matter how we fill our tables, we have
Hence, given the hash of any three of these keys, we just xor them to derive the hash of the fourth key.
Pseudorandom Numbers. The tables used in simple tabulation should be small to fit in the first level of cache. Thus, filling them with truly random numbers would not be difficult (e.g. in our experiments we use atmospheric noise from random.org). If the amount of randomness needs to be reduced further, we remark that all proofs continue to hold if each character table H i is filled by a (lg n)-independent hash function h i where the h i are independent of each other (in our proofs we would use the Chernoff bounds from Schmidt et al. [1995] ). We could therefore fill each character table using a degree (lg n) polynomial with random coefficients, and we could use multipoint evaluation to reduce the time spent computing each entry.
Generally we think of a pseudorandom number generator (PRG) as a hash function r on a large enough range [u] (we could have u = ∞), with the promise that each r(x) is evaluated once, in the order of increasing x starting from x = 0. Computing r(x) from scratch may be very inefficient-there may be no better way than computing the whole sequence r(0), .., r(x). We can use an PRG instead of a hash function whenever the numbers do not need to be computable from keys, for example, throwing balls into bins. Still we would like distributional properties like those form Theorem 1.1.
With this view, simple tabulation naturally lends itself to a implementation of very efficient pseudorandom number generators. We start with the obvious one. Indexing the characters according to the standard integer representation, we consider x = (x c−1 , ..., x 0 ) with x 0 the least significant character. The tables are indexed accordingly H c−1 , ..., H 0 . In the PRG case where we evaluate key values x = 0, 1, .., and note that x 1 , ..., x c−1 only changes when x 0 turns zero, that is, only once in every calls. We will therefore maintain H = i>0 H i (x i ) as a variable that is updated only when x 0 turns zero. The hash code of x can then be computed as H 0 [x 0 ] ⊕ H, which is very fast.
Less obviously, we will show how to speed up a slow but powerful PRG hash function r with range [u] . We exploit that none of our bounds depend on how large an alphabet each character is taken from, and the alphabets may be different for different character positions. We now consider 2-character keys x = (x 1 , x 0 ) ∈ [u] × . We use a table H 0 for x 0 and the PRG r for x 1 . The value for x is r(x 1 ) ⊕ H 0 [x 0 ]. Here x 1 starts at 0 and is incremented by 1 each time x 0 turns zero, so this is valid use of the r. As above, we maintain a variable H = r(x 1 ) with is only updated when x 1 is incremented, that is, once in every iterations. With large enough, the cost of evaluating r once in calls is minimized. For example, with = ω(log n), we implement r with a degree (log n) polynomial, evaluating each new value in O(log n) time. The cost per call is o(1). Thus our essential cost per call is that of evaluating H 0 [x 0 ] ⊕ H plus testing if x 0 = 0. Once again we get the distributional guarantees of Theorem 1.1, and using only c = 2 characters improves the hidden constants of our analysis. Experimental Evaluation. We performed an experimental evaluation of simple tabulation. Our implementation uses tables of 256 entries (i.e., using c = 4 characters for 32-bit keys and c = 8 characters with 64-bit keys). The time to evaluate the simple tabulation hashing turns out to be competitive with that of the fast multiplication-shift based 2-independent hash functions [Dietzfelbinger 1996] , and significantly faster than for hash functions with higher independence [Thorup and Zhang 2012] . We also evaluated simple tabulation in applications, in an effort to verify that the constants hidden in our analysis are not too large. Simple tabulation proved very robust and fast, both for linear probing and for cuckoo hashing.
Practical Relevance. We will now elaborate on the potential impact of our results for practice. Let us focus on linear probing which alone occupies a substantial fraction of the worlds computational resources. To be more precise, hash tables are often the bottleneck in data processing, and linear probing has long been one of the most popular implementation of hash tables, exploiting that computers offer fast sequential memory access. That is, with linear probing, the dominant cost is the general memory lookup of the hash location while the linear scan from this position is cheap.
Our result states that simple tabulation offers good probabilistic performance with linear probing on any input. We claim that this is important in practice. However, while simple tabulation has been known for more than forty years [Zobrist 1970 ], we are not aware of anyone that have used it for linear probing in practice.
Let us review the situation. We know [Mitzenmacher and Vadhan 2008 ] that linear probing has O(1) expected running times with any 2-independent hashing scheme if the input has enough entropy. Thus, for a given 2-independent hashing scheme, a bad input, if any, will have to be structured, and it is questionable is if such badly structured input will ever turn up in practice. Since we are dealing with randomized algorithms, practitioners are less likely to discover if they are just unlucky, or if they are dealing with systematic input problems. Bad structures leading to logarithmic expected performance are now known for several 2-independent hashing schemes [Pagh et al. 2009 ; Pǎtraşcu and Thorup 2010; Thorup and Zhang 2012] . In particular, for the fast multiplication-shift based hashing schemes [Dietzfelbinger 1996 ], it turns out that a dense interval forms a bad input structure [Pǎtraşcu and Thorup 2010; Thorup and Zhang 2012] . Dense intervals are indeed quite likely to occur in applications, and this could explain why linear probing has a reputation of being nonrobust.
If we want safe guarantees of expected constant running time on any input, the best option was 5-independent hashing [Pagh et al. 2009 ]. Now we know that simple tabulation, which is fast and simple to implement, but not even 4-independent, suffices for this guarantee.
Notation. We now introduce some notation that will be used throughout the proofs. We want to construct hash functions h : [u] → [m]. We use simple tabulation with an alphabet of and c = O(1) characters. Thus, u = c and h(x 1 , . . . ,
To simplify formulas, when it is clear from the context, we may also use to denote the number | | of characters. It is convenient to think of each hash code H i [x i ] as a fraction in [0, 1) with large enough precision. We always assume m is a power of two, so an m-bit hash code is obtained by keeping only the most significant log 2 m bits in such a fraction. We always assume the table stores long enough hash codes, that is, at least log 2 m bits.
Let S ⊆ c be a set of |S| = n keys, and let q be a query. We typically assume q / ∈ S, since the case q ∈ S only involves trivial adjustments (for instance, when looking at the load of the bin h(q), we have to add one when q ∈ S). Let π(S, i) be the projection of S on the i-th coordinate, π(S, i)
We define a position-character to be an element of [c] × . Then, the alphabets on each coordinate can be assumed to be disjoint: the first coordinate has alphabet {1}× , the second has alphabet {2} × , etc. Under this view, we can treat a key x as a set of q position-characters (on distinct positions). Furthermore, we can assume h is defined on position characters: h((i, α)) = H i [α] . This definition is extended to keys (sets of position-characters) in the natural way h(x) = α∈x h(α).
When we say with high probability in r, we mean 1 − r a for any desired constant a. Since c = O(1), high probability in is also high probability in u. If we just say "with high probability", it is understood to be in n.
Contents. The concentration bounds of Theorem 1.1 are proved in Section 2. Our analysis of linear probing is found in Section 3, and the analysis of minwise hashing is found in Section 5. The 4th moment is studied in Section 6, and finally, some experimental results are presented in Section 7.
CONCENTRATION BOUNDS
This section proves Theorem 1.1. If n keys are hashed into n 1+ε bins by a truly random hash function, the maximum load of any bin is O(1) with high probability. First we show that simple tabulation preserves this guarantee. Building on this, we shows that the load of any fixed bin obeys Chernoff bounds. Then we show that the Chernoff bounds hold even for a bin chosen as a function of the query hash code, h(q). The case of few bins with m ≤ n is done last in Section 4.
As stated in the introduction, the number of bins is always understood to be a power of two. This is because our hash values are xor'ed bit strings. If we want different numbers of bins we could view the hash values as fractions in the unit interval and divide the unit interval into subintervals. Translating our results to this setting is standard.
Hashing into Many Bins
The notion of "peeling" lies at the heart of most work in tabulation hashing. The idea is as follows. If a key x from a set S of keys contains a position-character (i, a) that doesn't appear in any other key, then the hash of x is the only one that depends on the random character table value H i [a] . We can think of (i, a) as being the last position-character from S to get its random value, and then it is clear that the hash of x is independent of how the rest of S hashes. To prove that the hashing of S is truly random, we can therefore "peel" x and focus on S \ {x}. More formally, we say a set S of keys is peelable if we can arrange the keys of S in some order, such that each key contains a positioncharacter that doesn't appear among the previous keys in the order. If S is peelable, the hashing of S is truly random. LEMMA 2.1. In any set T of d keys, we can find a peelable subset S of size at least max{d 1/c , lg d} keys, hence where the keys from S hash truly randomly.
PROOF. Since T ⊆ π(T, 1) × · · · × π(T, c), it follows that there exists i ∈ [c] with |π(T, i)| ≥ d 1/c . Pick some key from T for every character value in π(T, i); this is a peelable set of at least d 1/c .
To find a peelable set of size at least log 2 d, we proceed iteratively. Consider the coordinate giving the largest projection, j = arg max i |π(T, i)|. As long as |T| ≥ 2, |π(T, j)| ≥ 2. Let α be the most popular value in T for the j-th character, and let T contain only keys with α on the j-th coordinate. We have |T | ≥ |T|/|π(T, j)|. In the peelable subset, we keep one key for every value in π(T, j) \ {α}, and then recurse in T to obtain more keys. In each recursion step, we obtain k ≥ 1 keys, at the cost of decreasing log 2 |T| by log 2 (k + 1). Thus, we obtain at least log 2 d keys overall for S. LEMMA 2.2. Suppose we hash n ≤ m 1−ε keys into m bins, for some constant ε > 0. For any constant γ , all bins get less than d = min (1 + γ )/ε c , 2 (1+γ )/ε keys with
PROOF. From Lemma 2.1 we know that among any d keys, one can find a peelable subset of size at least b = max{d 1/c , lg d} . Then, a necessary condition for the maximum load of a bin to be at least d is that some bin contains b peelable keys. There are at most n b < n b such sets. Since the hash codes of a peelable set are independent, the probability that a fixed set lands into a common bin is 1 m b −1 . Thus, an upper bound on the probability that the maximum load is d can be obtained:
We note that, when the subset of keys of interest forms a combinatorial cube, the probabilistic analysis in the proof is sharp up to constant factors. In other words, the exponential dependence on c and γ is inherent.
Chernoff Bounds for a Fixed Bin
We study the number of keys ending up in a prespecified bin B. The analysis will define a total ordering ≺ on the space of position-characters, [c] × . Then we will analyze the random process by fixing hash values of position-characters h(α) in the order ≺. The hash value of a key x ∈ S becomes known when the position-character max ≺ x is fixed. For α ∈ [c] × , we define the group G α = {x ∈ S | α = max ≺ x}, the set of keys for whom α is the last position-character to be fixed.
The intuition is that the contribution of each group G α to the bin B is a random variable independent of the previous G β 's, since the keys G α are shifted by a new hash code h(α). Thus, if we can bound the contribution of G α by a constant, we can apply Chernoff bounds. LEMMA 2.3. There is an ordering ≺ such that the maximal group size is max α |G α | ≤ n 1−1/c . PROOF. We start with S being the set of all keys, and reduce S iteratively, by picking a position-character α as next in the order, and removing keys G α from S. At each point in time, we pick the position-character α that would minimize |G α |. Note that, if we pick some α as next in the order, G α will be the set of keys x ∈ S which contain α and contain no other character that hasn't been fixed: (∀)β ∈ x \ {α}, β ≺ α.
We have to prove that, as long as S = ∅, there exists α with |G α | ≤ |S| 1−1/c . If some position i has |π(S, i)| > |S| 1/c , there must be some character α on position i which appears in less than |S| 1−1/c keys; thus |G α | ≤ S 1−1/c . Otherwise, π(S, i) ≤ |S| 1/c for all i. Then if we pick an arbitrary character α on some position
From now on, assume the ordering ≺ has been fixed as in the lemma. This ordering partitions S into at most n non-empty groups, each containing at most n 1−1/c keys. We say a group G α is d-bounded if no bin contains more than d keys from G α . PROOF. Since |G α | ≤ n 1−1/c ≤ m 1−1/(2c) , by Lemma 2.2, we get that there are at most d keys from G α in any bin with probability 1 − m −(2+γ ) ≥ 1 − m −γ /n. The conclusion follows by union bound over the ≤ n groups.
Henceforth, we assume that γ and d are fixed as in Lemma 2.4. Chernoff bounds (see [Motwani and Raghavan 1995, Theorem 4 .1]) consider independent random variables X 1 , X 2 , · · · ∈ [0, d]. Let X = i X i , μ = E[X ], and δ > 0, the bounds are:
Let X α be the number of keys from G α landing in the bin B. We are quite close to applying Chernoff bounds to the sequence X α , which would imply the desired concentration around μ = n m . Two technical problems remain: X α 's are not d-bounded in the worst case, and they are not independent.
To address the first problem, we define the sequence of random variablesX α as follows: if G α is d-bounded, letX α = X α ; otherwiseX α = |G α |/m is a constant. Observe that αX α coincides with α X α if all groups are d-bounded, which happens with probability 1 − m −γ . Thus a probabilistic bound on αX α is a bound on α X α up to an additive m −γ in the probability.
Finally, theX α variables are not independent: earlier position-character dictate how keys cluster in a later group. Fortunately (5) holds even if the distribution of each X i is a function of X 1 , . . . , X i−1 , as long as the mean E[X i | X 1 , . . . , X i−1 ] is a fixed constant μ i independent of X 1 , ..., X i−1 . A formal proof will be given in the Appendix. We claim that our means are fixed this way: regardless of the hash codes for β < α, we will argue that E[X α ] = μ α = |G α |/m.
Observe that whether or not G α is d-bounded is determined before h(α) is fixed in the order ≺. Indeed, α is the last position-character to be fixed for any key in G α , so the hash codes of all keys in G α have been fixed up to an xor with h(α). This final shift by h(α) is common to all the keys, so it cannot change whether or not two keys land together in a bin. Therefore, the choice of
After fixing all hash codes β ≺ α, we decide if G α is d-bounded. If not, we set X α = |G α |/m. Otherwise,X α = X α is the number of keys we get in B when fixing h(α), and h(α) is a uniform random variable sending each key to B with probability 1/m. Therefore, E[X α ] = |G α |/m. This completes the proof that the number of keys in bin B obeys Chernoff bounds from (5), which immediately imply (2) and (3) in Theorem 1.1.
The Load of a Query-Dependent Bin
When we are dealing with a special key q (a query), we may be interested in the load of a bin B q , chosen as a function of the query's hash code, h(q). We show that our analysis also works for the size of B q , up to small constants. The critical change is to insist that the query position-characters come first in our ordering ≺.
LEMMA 2.5. There is an ordering ≺ placing the characters of q first, in which the maximal group size is 2 · n 1−1/c . PROOF. After placing the characters of q at the beginning of the order, we use the same iterative construction as in Lemma 2.3. Each time we select the position-character α minimizing |G α |, place α next in the order ≺, and remove G α from S. It suffices to prove that, as long as S = ∅, there exists a position-character α / ∈ q with |G α | ≤ 2 · |S| 1−1/c . Suppose in some position i, |π(S, i)| > |S| 1/c . Even if we exclude the query character q i , there must be some character α on position i that appears in at most |S|/(|π(S, i)| − 1) keys. Since S = ∅, |S| 1/c > 1, so |π(S, i)| ≥ 2. This means |π(S, i)| − 1 ≥ |S| 1/c /2, so α appears in at most 2|S| 1−1/c keys. Otherwise, we have π(S, i) ≤ |S| 1/c for all i. Then, for any character α on position i, we have
The lemma guarantees that the first nonempty group contains the query alone, and all later groups have random shifts that are independent of the query hash code. We lost a factor two on the group size, which has no effect on our asymptotic analysis. In particular, all groups are d-bounded with high probability, Letting X α be the contribution of G α to bin B q , we see that the distribution of X α is determined by the hash codes fixed previously (including the hash code of q, fixing the choice of the bin B q ). But E[X α ] = |G α |/m holds irrespective of the previous choices. Thus, Chernoff bounds continue to apply to the size of B q . This completes the proof of (2) and (3) in Theorem 1.1.
In Theorem 1.1, we limited ourselves to polynomially small error bounds m −γ for constant γ . However, we could also consider a super constant γ = ω(1) using the formula for d in Lemma 2.4. For the strongest error bounds, we would balance m −γ with the Chernoff bounds from (5). Such balanced error bounds would be messy, and we found it more appealing to elucidate the standard Chernoff-style behavior when dealing with polynomially small errors.
Few Bins
We will now settle Theorem 1.1 (4), proving some high probability bounds for the concentration with m ≤ n bins. As stated in (4), we will show, with high probability, that the number of keys in each bin is n/m ± O( n/mlog c n).
Consider any subset S of s ≤ n keys that only vary in b characters. Detailing (4), we will show for any L ≥ 32 log n, that with probability 1 − exp(− (L)), the keys in S get distributed with
keys in each of the m bins. This is trivial for m = 1, so we can assume m ≥ 2. The proof is by induction on (b , s). First, we will prove that each inductive step fails with small probability. Later we will conclude that the combined failure probability for the whole induction is small. For the base case of the induction, if s ≤ L b , the result is trivial since it holds even if some bin gets all the keys from S. This case includes if we have no characters to vary, that is, when s = 1 and b = 0. We may therefore assume that s > L b , and b > 0. The hashes of characters at positions where S do not vary will only shuffle the bins, but not affect which keys from S go together, so we can ignore them when giving bounds for the sizes of all bins.
Considering the varying characters in S, we apply the ordering from Section 2.2 leading to a grouping of S. By Lemma 2.3, there is an ordering ≺ such that the maximal group size is max
First, assume that s ≤ mL b /2. Each group has b − 1 free character and size at most s/L ≤ mL b −1 /2, so by induction, each group has at most L b −1 keys in each bin, that is, each group is L b −1 -bounded. Now as in Section 2.2, for any fixed bin, we can apply the Chernoff upper-bound from (5) with d = L b −1 . We have μ = s/m ≤ L b /2, and we want to bound the probability of getting a bin of size at least x = L b ≥ 2μ. For an upper bound, we use μ = x/2 ≥ μ and δ = 1, and get a probability bound of
With the union bound, the probability that any bin has more than L b keys is bounded by m(e/4) L/2 . Partitioning Many Keys. Next, we consider the more interesting case where s ≥ mL b /2. As stated in (6), we want to limit the probability that the contribution S to any bin deviates by more than √ s/mL b from the mean s/m. We partition the groups into levels i based on their sizes. On level 0 we have the groups of size up to mL b −1 /2. On level i > 0, we have the groups of size between t i = mL b −1 2 i−2 and 2t i . For each i, we let S i denote the union of the level i groups. We are going to handle each level i separately, providing a high probability bound on how much the contribution of S i to a given bin can deviate from the mean. Adding the deviations from all levels, we bound the total deviation in the contribution from S to this bin. Let s i be the number of keys in S i and define
For level i > 0, we will use i as our deviation bound, while we for i = 0, will usē 0 = max{ 0 , L b }.
The Total Deviation. We will now show that this level deviation bounds provide the desired total deviation bound of √ s/mL b from (6). Summing over the levels, the total deviation is bounded by
To bound the sum, we first consider the smaller terms where s i < s/ log n. Then,
We have at most log n values of i, so these smaller terms sum to at most √ s/mL b (log n)/L. Next, we consider the larger terms where s i ≥ s/ log n. Each such term can be bounded as
The sum of the larger terms is therefore also bounded by √ s/mL b (log n)/L. Thus, the total deviation is bounded by
Deviation from Small Groups. We now consider the contribution to our bin from the small groups in S 0 . These groups have size most mL b −1 /2, and b − 1 free character positions, so inductively from (6), each group contributes at most d 0 = L b −1 to each bin. We want to bound the probability that the deviation from the mean μ 0 = s 0 /m exceeds 0 = max{ 0 , L b }.
Suppose μ 0 ≤¯ 0 . For a Chernoff upper bound, we use μ =¯ 0 ≥ μ 0 and δ = 1, and get a probability bound of
On the other hand, if μ 0 ≥ 0 , we have a relative deviation of δ 0 = 0 /μ 0 = √ m/s 0 L b −1/2 ≤ 1. The probability of this deviation for any fixed bin is bounded by
The first inequality used the standard Chernoff approximation for δ ≤ 1 that
Larger Groups. To deal with a larger group level i > 1, we will use a standard symmetric Chernoff bound, which is easily derived from the negative version of (5). We consider n independent random variables X 1 , ....,
As we did for (5) in Section 2.2, we note that (8) also holds when X i depends on the previous X j , j < i, as long as |X i | ≤ d and E[X i ] = 0. Back to our problem, let s i be the total size. Each group G has size at least t i = mL b −1 2 i−2 , so we have at most n i = s i /t i groups. The group G has only b − 1 varying characters and t i ≥ t 1 = mL b −1 /2, so inductively from (6), the contribution of G to any bin deviates by at most d i = |G|/mL b −1 < 2t i /mL b −1 from the mean |G|/m. We let X G denote the contribution of G to our bin minus the mean |G|/m. Thus, regardless of the distribution of previous groups, we have E[X G ] = 0 and |X G | ≤ d i . We want to bound the probability that | G X G | ≥ i . We therefore apply (8) with
The probability that the contribution to our bin deviates by more than i is therefore bounded by
Conveniently, this dominates the error probabilities of (e/4) L and exp(−L/3) from level 0. There are less than log n levels, so by the union bound, the probability of a too large deviation from any level to any bin is bounded by m(log n)2 exp(−L/8).
Error Probability for the Whole Induction. Previously, we proved that any particular inductive step fails with probability at most m(log n)2 exp(−L/8). We want to conclude that the probability of any failure in the whole induction is bounded by nm exp(−L/8).
First, we note that the all the parameters of the inductive steps are determined deterministically. More precisely, the inductive step is defined via the deterministic grouping from Lemma 2.3. This grouping corresponds to a certain deterministic ordering of the position characters, and we use this ordering to analyze the failure probability of the inductive step. However, there is no relation between the ordering used to analyze different inductive steps. Thus, we are dealing with a recursive deterministic partitioning. Each partitioning results in groups that are at least L times smaller, so the recursion corresponds to a tree with degrees at least L. At the bottom, we have base cases, each containing at least one key. The internal nodes correspond to inductive steps, so we have less than 2n/L of these. If L ≥ 4 log n, we conclude that the combined failure probability is at most (2n/L)m(log n)2 exp(−L/8) ≤ nm exp(−L/8). With L ≥ 32 log n, we get that the overall failure probability is bounded by exp(−L/64). This completes our proof that (6) is satisfied with high probability, hence the proof of Theorem 1.1 (4).
We consider linear probing using simple tabulation hashing to store a set S of n keys in an array of size m (as in the rest of our analyses, m is a power of two). When inserting keys with linear probing, we place a key x in the first empty location starting from the hash location h(x). We normally use wrap-around in the sense that location 0 follows location m − 1, but for simplicity, we ignore this boundary issue here. The invariant preserved is that if x is in location j, then all locations [h(x), j) have to be full. Let α = 1 − ε = n m be the load factor. We will argue that the performance with simple tabulation is within constant factors of the performance with a truly random function, both in the regime α ≥ 1/2 (high load factor) and α ≤ 1/2 (low load factor). With high load factor, the expected number of probes when we insert a new key is O(1/ε 2 ) and with low load factor, it is 1 + O(α). Pagh et al. [2009] presented an analysis of linear probing with 5-independent hashing using 4th moment bounds. They got a bound of O(1/ε 13/6 ) on the expected number of probes. We feel that our analysis, which is centered around dyadic intervals, is simpler, tighter, and more generic (a dyadic interval is an interval of the form [ j2 i , ( j +1)2 i ) for integers i and j). In fact, as we shall see later in Section 6.4, our analysis also leads to an optimal O(1/ε 2 ) for 5-independent hashing, settling an open problem from Pagh et al. [2009] . However, with simple tabulation, we get much stronger concentration than with 5-independent hashing, for example, constant variance with constant ε whereas the variance is only known to be O(log n) with 5-independent hashing.
When studying the complexity of linear probing, the basic measure is the length R = R(q, S) of the longest run of filled positions starting from h(q), that is, positions h(q), ..., h(q) + − 1 are filled with keys from S while h(q) + R is empty. This is the case if and only if R is the largest number such there is an interval I which contains h(q) and h(q) + R − 1 and such that I is full in the sense that at least |I| keys from S hash to I. In our analysis, we assume that q is not in the set. An insert or unsuccessful search with q will consider exactly R + 1 positions. A successful search for q will consider at most R(q, S \ {q}) + 1 positions. For deletions, the cost is R(q, S) + 1 but where q ∈ S. For now we assume q ∈ S, but we shall return to the case q ∈ S after we have proved our main technical theorem in Section 3.1.
Aiming for upper bounds on R(q, S), it is simpler to study the symmetric length L(q, S) of the longest filled interval containing h(q). Trivially R(q, S) ≤ L(q, S). We have n = |S| keys hashed into m positions. The following theorem considers the case of general relative deviation δ. To bound Pr[L(q, S) ≥ ], we can apply it with p = h(q) and δ = ε or (1 + δ) = 1/α. THEOREM 3.1. Consider hashing a set of n keys into {0, ..., m − 1} using simple tabulation (so m is a power of two). Define the load factor α = n/m. Let p be any point which may or may not be a function of the hash value of a specific query key not in the set. Let D ,δ, p be the event that there exists an interval I containing p where |I| ≥ and such that the number of keys X I in I deviates at least δ from the mean, that is,
Moreover, with probability 1 − n −γ , for every interval I, if α|I| ≥ 1, the number of keys in I is
Theorem 3.1 is a very strong generalization of Theorem 1.1. A bin from Theorem 3.1 corresponds to a specific dyadic interval of length = 2 i (using m = m/2 i in Theorem 3.1). In Theorem 3.1, we consider every interval of length at least that contains a specific point, yet we get the same deviation bound modulo a change in the constants hidden in the -notation. PROOF OF THEOREM 3.1. To prove the bound on D ,δ, p , we first consider the weaker event C i,δ, p for integer i that there exists an interval I p, 2 i ≤ |I| < 2 i+1 , such that the relative deviation δ in the number of keys X I is at least δ. As a start we will prove that the bound from (9) holds for C i,δ, p . Essentially, Theorem 3.1 will follow because the probability bounds decrease exponentially in i.
When bounding the probability of C i,δ, p , we will consider any i such that α2 i ≤ n 1/(2c) whereas, in Theorem 3.1, we only considered α ≤ n 1/(3c) . The constraint α2 i ≤ n 1/(2c) matches that in Theorem 1.1 with m = m/2 i . In Theorem 1.1, we required m
Our proof is based on decompositions of intervals into dyadic intervals. To simplify the terminology and avoid confusion between intervals and dyadic intervals, we let a bin on level j, or for short, a j-bin, denote a dyadic interval of length 2 j . The expected number of keys in a j-bin is μ j = α2 j . The j-bins correspond to the bins in Theorem 1.1 with m = m/2 j . For any j ≤ i, consider the j-bin containing p, and the 2 i+1− j j-bins on either side. We say that these 2 i+2− j + 1 consecutive j-bins are relevant to C i,δ, p noting that they cover any I p, |I| ≤ 2 i+1 . δ = (1). To handle δ = (1), we will use the following combinatorial claim that holds for any δ. CLAIM 3.1.1. Let j be maximal such that 2 j < δ 1+δ/2 2 i−2 . If C i,δ, p happens, then one of the relevant j-bins contains more than 1 + δ 2 α2 j keys. PROOF. Assume that all the relevant j-bins have relative deviation at most δ 2 . Let I be an interval witnessing C i,δ, p , that is, p ∈ I, 2 i ≤ |I| < 2 i+1 , and the number of keys in I deviates by δα|I| from the mean α|I|. The interval I contains some number of the j-bins, and properly intersects at most two in the ends. The relative deviation within I is δ, but the j-bins have only half this relative deviation. This means that the j-bins contained in I can contribute at most half the deviation. The remaining δ 2 α|I| has to come from the two j-bins intersected in the ends. Those could contribute all or none of their keys to the deviation (e.g., all keys are on the last/first position of the interval). However, together they have at most 2 1 + δ 2 α2 j < δα2 i−1 ≤ δ 2 α|I| keys. Let δ = (1) and define j as in Claim 3.1.1. Then, j = i − (1). To bound the probability of C i,δ, p it suffices to bound the probability that none of the 2 i+2− j + 1 = O(1) relevant j-bins has relative deviation beyond δ = δ/2. We will apply Theorem 1.1 (3) with m = m/2 j and μ = α2 j to each of these j-bins. Checking the conditions of Theorem 1.1, we note that the kth relevant j-bin can specified as a function of p which again may be a function of the hash of the query. Also, as noted previously, m > m/2 i ≥ n/(α2 i ) ≥ n 1−1/(2c) . From (3), we get that
δ ≤ 1. We now consider the case δ ≤ 1. In particular, this covers the case δ = o(1) which was not covered previously. The issue is that, if we apply Claim 3.1.1, we could get j = i − ω(1), hence ω(1) relevant j-bins, and then the applying the union bound would lead to a loss. To circumvent the problem, we will consider a tight decomposition involving bins on many levels below i but with bigger deviations on lower levels. For any level j ≤ i, we say that a j-bin is "dangerous" for level i if it has deviation at least:
First we make the standard dyadic decomposition of I into maximal level bins: at most two j-bins on each level j = 0 . . i. For technical reasons, if j 0 > 0, the decomposition is "rounded to level j 0 ". Formally, the decomposition rounded to level j 0 is obtained by discarding all the bins on levels below j 0 , and including one j 0 -bin on both sides (each covering the discarded bins on lower levels). Note that all the level bins in the decomposition of I are relevant to C i,δ, p .
Assume for a contradiction that no relevant bin on levels j 0 , ..., i is dangerous for level i. In particular, this includes all the level bins from our decomposition. We will sum their deviations, and show that I cannot have the required deviations. In case of rounding, all keys in the two rounding j 0 -bins can potentially be in or out of I (all keys in such intervals can hash to the beginning/end), contributing at most j 0 ,i + α2 j 0 keys to the deviation in I. By choice of j 0 , we have α2 j 0 −1 < j 0 −1,i . It follows that the total contribution from the rounding bins is at most
The other bins from the decomposition are internal to I. This includes discarded ones in case of rounding. A j-bin contributes at most j,i to the deviation in I, and there are at most 2 such j-bins for each j. The combined internal contribution is therefore bounded by
The total deviation is thus at 1 4 + 7.73 12 δα2 i , contradicting that I had deviation δα2 i .
For each j = j 0 , ..., i, we bound the probability that there exists a relevant j-bin which is dangerous for level i. There are 2 2+i− j + 1 such intervals. We have mean μ j = α2 j and
. Note that δ i, j < 1 by choice of j 0 . We can therefore apply (2) from Theorem 1.1. Hence, for any constant γ , the probability that there exists a relevant j-bin which is dangerous for i is bounded by
To bound the probability of C i,δ, p , we sum this bound for j = j 0 , ..., i. We will argue that the j = i dominates. If γ > 2, then clearly this is the case for the term
At first this may seem obvious since the increase with h is exponential while the decrease is doubly exponential. The statement is, however, not true if
. We need to argue that α2 i δ 2 = (1). Then for h = ω(1), the bound will decrease super-exponentially in h. Recall that our final goal for δ ≤ 1 is to prove that Pr [C i,δ, p 
This statement is trivially true if exp(− (α2 i δ 2 )) ≥ 1/2. Thus we may assume exp(− (α2 i δ 2 )) < 1/2 and this implies α2 i δ 2 = (1), as desired. Therefore the sum in (12) is dominated in by the case h = (i − j) = 0. Summing up, for any constant γ > 2 and δ ≤ 1, we have proved that
The constraint γ > 2 has no effect, since we get better bounds with larger γ as long as γ remains constant. All together, for α2 i ≤ n 1/(2c) or equivalently, m/2 i ≥ n 1−1/(2c) , we have proved
We now want to bound Pr[D ,δ, p ] as in (9). For our asymptotic bound, it suffices to consider cases where = 2 k is a power of two. Essentially, we will use the trivial bound δ, p ]. First we want to argue that the terms e − (α2 k+h δ 2 ) = e − (α2 k δ 2 )2 h , δ ≤ 1, and (1 + δ) − ((1+δ)α2 k+h ) = (1 + δ) − ((1+δ)α2 k )2 h , δ = (1), are dominated by the case h = 0. Both terms are of the form 1/a 2 h and we want to show that a = 1 + (1). For the case δ ≤ 1, we can use the same trick before: to prove (9) it suffices to consider exp(− (α2 k δ 2 )) < 1/2 which implies α2 k δ 2 = (1) and e (α2 k δ 2 ) = 1+ (1). When it comes to (1 + δ) − ((1+δ)α2 k+h ) , we have δ = (1). Moreover, to get the strongest probability bound on Pr[D 2 k ,δ, p ], we can assume (1 + δ)α2 k ≥ 1. More precisely, suppose (1 + δ)α2 k < 1 and define δ > δ such that (1 + δ )α2 k = 1. If an interval is nonempty, it has at least 1 key, so D 2 k ,δ, p ⇐⇒ D 2 k ,δ , p , and the probability bound from (9) is better with the larger δ . Thus, we can assume (1 + δ) ((1+δ)α2 k ) = 1 + (1). We have now established that for any relevant δ, the bound from (13) is of the form 1/a 2 h + (2 k+h /m) γ where a = 1 + (1).
As desired, the first term is dominated by the smallest h = 0. Two issues remain: the second term is dominated by larger h and (13) only applies when m/2 k+h ≥ n 1−1/(2c) . Defineh as the smallest value such that a 2h ≥ m/2 k . We have 2h = log a (m/2 k ) = O(log(m/2 k )) and the condition for (9) is that n 1−1/(3c) ≤ m/2 k , so m/2 k+h = (m/2 k )/O(log(m/2 k )) =˜ (n 1−1/(3c) ) > n 1−1/(2c) . We conclude that (13) applies for any h ≤h.
To handle h ≥h, we consider the more general event A i,δ that the contribution to any interval of length at least 2 i has relative deviation at least δ. It is easy to see that
More precisely, consider the m/2 i points p that are multiples of 2 i . Any interval I of length ≥ 2 i can be partitioned into intervals I j such that 2 i ≤ |I j | < 2 i+1 and p j = jm/2 i ∈ I j . If I has relative deviation δ, then so does some I j , and then C i,δ, p j is satisfied.
Thus (14) follows. With our particular value of i = k +h, for any γ > 1, we get
Finally we are ready to compute Pr
In Pr[C k+h,δ, p ] = 1/a 2 h + (2 k+h /m) γ , the terms 1/a 2 h were dominated by h = 0, and the terms (2 k+h /m) γ are dominated by h =h which is covered by Pr[A k+h,δ ]. We conclude that
Since γ can always be picked larger, this completes the proof of (9) in Theorem 3.1.
Larger Intervals. To finish the proof of Theorem 3.1, we need to consider the case of larger intervals. We want to show that, with probability 1 − n −γ for any γ = O(1), for every interval I where the mean number of keys is α|I| ≥ 1, the deviation is at most O α|I| log c n .
Consider an interval I with α|I| ≥ 1. As in the proof of Claim 3.1.2, we consider a maximal dyadic decomposition into level bins with up to two j-bins for each j ≤ i = log 2 |I| . Let j 0 = log 2 (1/α) . Again we round to level j 0 , discarding the lower level bins, but adding a j 0 -bin on either side. The deviation in I is bounded by total deviation of the internal bins plus the total contents of the side bins. The expected number of keys in each side bins is α2 j 0 ≤ 2.
For each j ∈ { j 0 , ..., i}, we apply Theorem 1.1 with m = m/2 j ≤ αm = n bins. With high probability, the maximal deviation for any j-bins is O √ n/m log c n = O √ α2 j log c n . This gives a total deviation of at most
as desired. For each j, there is an error probability of n −γ for any γ = O(1). The error probability over all j ∈ { j 0 , ..., i} is (i − j 0 + 1)n −γ . Here i − j 0 ≤ log 2 m − log 2 (1/α) = log 2 m − log 2 m n = log 2 n, so (i − j 0 + 1)n −γ ≤ n −γ (1 + log n). This completes the proof of Theorem 3.1. 
The Cost of Linear Probing
We now return to the original issue of estimating the costs of the different operations in linear probing with simple tabulation hashing. We have stored a set S of n keys in a table of size m. Define the load factor α = n/m and ε = 1 − α. For any key q we let R = R(q, S) be the number of filled positions from the hash location of q to the nearest empty slot. For insertions and unsuccessful searches, we have q ∈ S, and then the number of cells probed is exactly R(q, S) + 1. This also expresses the number of probes when we delete, but in deletions, we have q ∈ S. Finally, in a successful search, the number of probes is bounded by R(q, S\ {q}) + 1. From Theorem 3.1, we get tail bounds on R(q, S) including the case where q ∈ S. COROLLARY 3.2. For any γ = O(1) and ≤ n 1/(3c) /α,
PROOF. When q ∈ S, we simply apply (9) from Theorem 3.1 with p = h(q). If ε ≤ 1/2, we use δ = ε, and if α ≤ 1/2, we use (1 + δ) = 1/α implying δ ≥ 1/2. In fact, we can do almost the same if q ∈ S. We will only apply Theorem 3.1 to S = S \ {q} which has load factor α < α. If α ≥ 1/2, we note that (15) does not provide a nontrivial bounds if = O(1/ε 2 ), so we can easily assume ≥ 2/ε. For any interval of this length to be filled by S, the contribution from S has to have a relative deviation of at least ε/2. For α ≤ 1/2, we note that we can assume ≥ 4, and we choose δ such that (1 + 2δ) = 1/α. Since 1/α ≥ 2, we have (1 + δ) ≤ (3/4)/α. For an interval of length to be full, it needs (1 + 2δ)α ≥ 1 + (1 + δ)α keys from S, so it needs at least (1 + δ)α keys from S . Now (15) follows from (9) 
From Corollary 3.2 it follows that we for α ≥ 1/2 get a tight concentration of R(q, S) around (1/ε 2 ), from example, for any moment p = O(1), E[R(q, S) p ] = O(1/ε 2 p ). Now consider smaller load factors α ≤ 1/2. Corollary 3.2 does not offer strong bound on Pr[R(q, S) > 0]. It works better when R(q, S) exceeds some large enough constant. However, in Section 6, we show that simple tabulation satisfies a certain 4th moment bounds, and in Section 6.4 (27), we show that when q ∈ S, this implies that linear probing fills a location depending on h(q) with probability O(α). Thus, we add to Corollary 3.2 that for q ∈ S,
Combining this with the exponential drop for larger R(q, S) in Corollary 3.2, it follows for any constant moment p that E[R(q, S) p ] = O(α) when q ∈ S. Now consider q ∈ S as in deletions. The probability that S = S \ {q} fills either h(q) or h(q) + 1 is O(α). Otherwise, S fills h(q) leaving h(q) + 1 empty, and then R(q, S) = 1. Therefore, for q ∈ S,
Combining this with the exponential drop for larger R(q, S) in Corollary 3.2, it follows for any constant moment p that E[R(q, S) p ] = 1 + O(α) when q ∈ S.
CUCKOO HASHING
Recall that in cuckoo hashing we use two tables of size m ≥ (1 + ε)n and independent hash functions h 0 and h 1 mapping the keys to these two tables. Cuckoo hashing succeeds if we can place every key in one of its two hash locations without any collision. We can think of this as a bipartite graph with a set for each table and an edge (h 0 (x), h 1 (x)) for each key x. Cuckoo hashing fails exactly if this graph has a component with more edges than vertices. With truly random hashing, this bad event happens with probability ( 1 n ). We are now going to analyze the failure probability of cuckoo hashing with simple tabulation hasing. In our analysis of chaining and linear probing, we did not worry so much about constants. However, with Cuckoo hashing, we do have to worry about obstructions that stem from the hashing of just a constant number of keys. An extreme case of such an obstruction is three keys that on both sides hash to the same location. It is, in fact, a constant sized obstruction that provides the negative side of our result.
OBSERVATION 4.1. There exists a set S of n keys such that cuckoo hashing with simple tabulation hashing cannot place S into two tables of size 2n with probability (n −1/3 ).
PROOF. The hard instance is the 3-dimensional cube [n 1/3 ] 3 . Here is a sufficient condition for cuckoo hashing to fail:
(1) there exist a, b , c ∈ [n 1/3 ] 2 with h 0 (a) = h 0 (b ) = h 0 (c);
(2) there exist x, y ∈ [n 1/3 ] with h 1 (x) = h 1 (y).
If both happen, then the elements ax, ay, b x, b y, cx, cy cannot be hashed. Indeed, on the left side h 0 (a) = h 0 (b ) = h 0 (c) so they only occupy 2 positions. On the right side, h 1 (x) = h 1 (y) so they only occupy 3 positions. In total, they occupy 5 < 6 positions.
The probability of (1) is asymptotically (n 2/3 ) 3 /n 2 = (1). This is because tabulation (on two characters) is 3-independent. The probability of (2) is asymptotically (n 1/3 ) 2 /n = (1/n 1/3 ). So overall cuckoo hashing fails with probability (n −1/3 ).
Our positive result will effectively show that this is the worst possible instance: for any set S, the failure probability is O(n −1/3 ).
The proof is an encoding argument. A tabulation hash function from c → [m] has entropy | | c lg m bits; we have two random functions h 0 and h 1 . If, under some event E, one can encode the two hash functions h 0 , h 1 using 2| | c lg m − γ bits, it follows that Pr[E] = O(2 −γ ). Letting E S denote the event that cuckoo hashing fails on the set of keys S, we will demonstrate a saving of γ = 1 3 lg n − f (c, ε) = 1 3 lg n − O(1) bits in the encoding. Note that we are analyzing simple tabulation on a fixed set of n keys, so both the encoder and the decoder know S.
We will consider various cases, and give algorithms for encoding some subset of the hash codes (we can afford O(1) bits in the beginning of the encoding to say which case we are in). At the end, the encoder will always list all the remaining hash codes in order. If the algorithm chooses to encode k hash codes, it will use space at most k lg m− 1 3 lg n+ O(1) bits. That is, it will save 1 3 lg n− O(1) bits in the complete encoding of h 0 and h 1 .
An Easy Way Out
A subkey is a set of position-characters on distinct positions. If a is a subkey, we let C(a) = {x ∈ S | a ⊆ x} be the set of "completions" of a to a valid key.
We first consider an easy way out: there subkeys a and b on the positions such that |C(a)| ≥ n 2/3 , |C(b )| ≥ n 2/3 , and h i (a) = h i (b ) for some i ∈ {0, 1}. Then, we can easily save 1 3 lg n − O(1) bits. First, we write the set of positions of a and b , and the side of the collision (c + 1 bits). There are at most n 1/3 subkeys on those positions that have ≥ n 2/3 completions each, so we can write the identities of a and b using 1 3 lg n bits each. We write the hash codes h i for all characters in a b (the symmetric difference of a and b ), skipping the last one, since it can be deduced from the collision. This uses c + 1 + 2 · 1 3 lg n + (|a b | − 1) lg m bits to encode |a b | hash codes, so it saves 1 3 lg n − O(1) bits. The rest of the proof assumes that there is no easy way out.
Walking Along an Obstruction
Consider the bipartite graph with m nodes on each side and n edges going from h 0 (x) to h 1 (x) for all x ∈ S. Remember that cuckoo hashing succeeds if and only if no component in this graph has more edges than nodes. Assuming cuckoo hashing failed, the encoder can find a subgraph with one of two possible obstructions: (1) a cycle with a chord; or (2) two cycles connected by a path (possibly a trivial path, that is, the cycles simply share a vertex).
Let v 0 be a node of degree 3 in such an obstruction, and let its incident edges be a 0 , a 1 , a 2 . The obstruction can be traversed by a walk that leaves v 0 on edge a 0 , returns to v 0 on edge a 1 , leaves again on a 2 , and eventually meets itself. Other than visiting v 0 and the last node twice, no node or edge is repeated. See Figure 1 .
Let x 1 , x 2 , . . . be the sequence of keys in the walk. The first key is x 1 = a 0 . Technically, when the walk meets itself at the end, it is convenient to expand it with an extra key, namely the one it first used to get to the meeting point. This repeated key marks the end of the original walk, and we chose it so that it is not identical to the last original key. Let x ≤i = j≤i x j be the position-characters seen in keys up to x i . Definê x i = x i \ x <i to be the position-characters of x i not seen previously in the sequence. Let k be the first position such thatx k+1 = ∅. Such a k certainly exists, since the last key in our walk is a repeated key.
At a high level, the encoding algorithm will encode the hash codes ofx 1 , . . . ,x k in this order. Note that the obstruction, hence the sequence (x i ), depends on the hash functions h 0 and h 1 . Thus, the decoder does not know the sequence, and it must also be written in the encoding.
For notational convenience, let h i = h i mod 2 . This means that in our sequence x i and x i+1 collide in their h i hash code, that is h i (x i ) = h i (x i+1 ). Formally, we define three subroutines.
ID(x). Write the identity of x ∈ S in the encoding, which takes lg n bits.
HASHES(h i , x k ). Write the hash codes h i of the charactersx k . This takes |x k | lg m bits.
COLL(x i , x i+1 ). Document the collision h i (x i ) = h i (x i+1 ). We write all h i hash codes of charactersx i ∪x i+1 in some fixed order. The last hash code ofx i x i+1 is redundant and will be omitted. Indeed, the decoder can compute this last hash code from the equality h i (x i ) = h i (x i+1 ). Sincex i+1 = x i+1 \x ≤i ,x i+1 \x i = ∅, so there exists a hash code inx i x i+1 . This subroutine uses |x i ∪x i+1 | − 1 lg m bits, saving lg m bits compared to the trivial alternative: HASHES(h i , x i ); HASHES(h i , x i+1 ).
To decode this information, the decoder will need enough context to synchronize with the coding stream. For instance, to decode COLL(x i , x i+1 ), one typically needs to know i, and the identities of x i and x i+1 .
Our encoding begins with the value k, encoded with O(lg k) bits, which allows the decoder to know when to stop. The encoding proceeds with the output of the stream of operations:
ID(x 1 );HASHES(h 0 , x 1 ); ID(x 2 ); COLL(x 1 , x 2 );
. . . ID(x k ); COLL(x k , x k−1 ); HASHES(h k , x k )
We observe that for each i > 1, we save ε bits of entropy. Indeed, ID(x i ) uses lg n bits, but COLL(x i−1 , x i ) then saves lg m = lg((1 + ε)n) ≥ ε + lg n bits. The trouble is ID(x 1 ), which has an upfront cost of lg n bits. We must devise algorithms that modify this stream of operations and save 4 3 lg n− O(1) bits, giving an overall saving of 1 3 lg n − O(1). (For intuition, observe that a saving that ignores the cost of ID(x 1 ) bounds the probability of an obstruction at some fixed vertex in the graph. This probability must be much smaller than 1/n, so we can union bound over all vertices. In encoding terminology, this saving must be much more than lg n bits.)
We will use modifications to all types of operations. For instance, we will sometimes encode ID(x) with much less than lg n bits. At other times, we will be able to encode COLL(x i , x i+1 ) with the cost of |x i ∪x i+1 |−2 characters, saving lg n bits over the standard encoding.
Since we will make several such modifications, it is crucial to verify that they only touch distinct operations in the stream. Each modification to the stream will be announced at the beginning of the stream with a pointer taking O(lg k) bits. This way, the decoder knows when to apply the special algorithms. We note that terms of O(lg k) are negligible, since we are already saving εk bits by the basic encoding (ε bits per edge). For any k, O(lg k) ≤ εk + f (c, ε) = k + O(1). Thus, if our overall saving is 1 3 lg n − O(lg k) + εk, it achieves the stated bound of lg n − O(1).
Safe Savings
Remember thatx k+1 = ∅, which suggests that we can save a lot by local changes towards the end of the encoding. We have x k+1 ⊂ x ≤k , so x k+1 \ x <k ⊆x k . We will first treat the case when x k+1 \ x <k is a proper subset ofx k (including the empty subset). This is equivalent tox k ⊂ x k+1 . LEMMA 4.2 (SAFE-STRONG). Ifx k ⊂ x k+1 , we can save lg n − O(c lg k) bits by changing HASHES(x k ).
PROOF. We can encode ID(x k+1 ) using c lg k extra bits, since it consists only of known characters from x ≤k . For each position 1 . . c, it suffices to give the index of a previous x i that contained the same position-character. Then, we will write all hash codes h k for the characters inx k , except for some
). All quantities on the right-hand side are known (in particular α / ∈ x k+1 ), so the decoder can compute h k (α).
It remains to treat the case when the last revealed characters of x k+1 are preciselyx k : x k ⊂ x k+1 . That is, both x k and x k+1 consist ofx k and some previously known characters. In this case, the collision h k (x k ) = h k (x k+1 ) does not provide us any information, since it reduces to the trivial h k (x k ) = h k (x k ). Assuming that we didn't take the "easy way out", we can still guarantee a more modest saving of 1 3 lg n bits. LEMMA 4.3 (SAFE-WEAK). Let K be the set of position-characters known before encoding ID(x i ), and assume there is no easy way out. If x i x i+1 ⊆ x <i , then we can encode both ID(x i ) and ID(x i+1 ) using a total of 2 3 lg n + O(c lg |K|) bits.
A typical case where we apply the lemma is i = k and K = x <k . Ifx k ⊂ x k+1 , we have x k x k+1 ⊂ K. Thus, we can obtain ID(x k ) for roughly 2 3 lg n bits, which saves 1 3 lg n bits. PROOF OF LEMMA 4.3. With O(c lg k) bits, we can code the subkeys x i ∩ x <i and x i+1 ∩ x <i . It remains to code z = x i \ x <i = x i+1 \ x <i . Since z is common to both keys x i and x i+1 , we have that x i \ z and x i+1 \ z are subkeys on the same positions. With no easy way out and h i (
In the former case, we code z as a member of C(x i \ z) with 2 3 lg n bits; otherwise, we code z as member of C(x i+1 \ z).
Piggybacking
Before moving forward, we present a general situation when we can save lg n bits by modifying a COLL(x i , x i+1 ) operation.
LEMMA 4.4. We can save lg n − O(lg k) bits by modifying COLL(x i , x i+1 ) if we have identified two (sub)keys e and f satisfying:
PROOF. In the typical encoding of COLL(x i , x i+1 ), we saved one redundant character from h i (x i ) = h i (x i+1 ), which is an equation involving (x i x i+1 ) \ x <i and some known characters from x <i . The lemma guarantees a second linearly independent equation over the charactersx i ∪x i+1 , so we can save a second redundant character.
Formally, let α be a position-character of (e f ) \ x <i , and β a position-character in (x i x i+1 ) \ x <i but outside (e f ) \ x <i . Note β = α and such a β exists by assumption. We write the h i hash codes of position characters (x i ∪x i+1 ) \ {α, β}. The hash h i (α) can be deduced since α is the last unknown in the equality h i (e \ f ) = h i ( f \ e). The hash h i (β) can be deduced since it is the last unknown in the equality h i (x) = h i (x i+1 ).
While the safe saving ideas only require simple local modifications to the encoding, they achieve a weak saving of 1 3 lg n bits for the casex k ⊂ x k+1 . A crucial step in our proof is to obtain a saving of lg n bits for this case. We do this by one of the following two lemmas. 
We can save lg n − O(c lg k) bits by changing COLL(x i+1 , x i+2 ).
PROOF. We apply Lemma 4.4 with the subkeysẽ = e\ f andf = f \e. We can identify these in O(c lg k) bits, since they only contain characters of x ≤i+1 . Since e and f have different free characters beforex i+1 , but identical free characters afterward, it must be thatẽ ∪f ⊂ x i+1 byẽ ∪f ⊆ x ≤i . To show (e f ) \ x <i = (x i+1 x i+2 ) \ x ≤i , remark that x i+2 = ∅ andx i+2 cannot have characters ofẽ ∪f . Thus, Lemma 4.4 applies.
LEMMA 4.6 (PIGGYBACKING). Consider two edges e, f and an i ≤ k − 1 satisfying:
We can encode ID(e) and ID( f ) using only O(c lg k) bits, after modifications to ID(x i ), ID(x i+1 ), and COLL(x i , x i+1 ).
The proof of this lemma is more delicate, and is given after the proof of Lemma 4.7. The difference between the two lemmas is the parity (side in the bipartite graph) of the collision of x i and x i+1 versus the collision of e and f . In the second result, we cannot actually save lg n bits, but we can encode ID(e) and ID( f ) almost for free: we say e and f piggyback on the encodings of x i and x i+1 .
Through a combination of the two lemmas, we can always achieve a saving lg n bits in the casex k ⊂ x k+1 , improving on the safe-weak bound:
LEMMA 4.7. Assume k is minimal such thatx k ⊂ x k+1 . We can save lg n − O(c lg k) bits if we may modify any operations in the stream, up to those involving x k+1 .
PROOF. We will choose e = x k and f = x k+1 . We have e \ x <k = f \ x <k =x k . On the other hand, e \ x 1 = f \ x 1 since x 1 only reveals one character per position. Thus there must be some 1 ≤ i < k − 1 where the transition happens: e \ x ≤i = f \ x ≤i but e \ x ≤i+1 = f \ x ≤i+1 . If i has the opposite parity compared to k, Lemma 4.5 saves a lg n term. (Note that i ≤ k − 2 as required by the lemma.)
If i has the same parity as k, Lemma 4.6 gives us ID(x k ) at negligible cost. Then, we can remove the operation ID(x k ) from the stream, and save lg n bits. (Again, note that i ≤ k − 2 as required.)
Therefore, e f ⊂ x ≤i+1 and (e f ) ∩x i+1 = ∅. Lemma 4.4 applies if we furthermore have (e f ) \ x <i = (x i x i+1 ) \ x <i . If the lemma applies, we have a saving of lg n, so we can afford to encode ID(e). Then ID( f ) can be encoded using O(c lg k) bits, since f differs from e only in position-characters from x ≤i+1 .
If the lemma does not apply, we have a lot of structure on the keys. Let y =x i \ (e ∪ f ) and g = e \ x ≤i+1 = f \ x ≤i+1 . We must have y ⊂ x i+1 , for otherwisex i \ x i+1 contains an elements outside e f and the lemma applies. We must also havex i+1 ⊂ e ∪ f .
We can write ID(x i ), ID(x i+1 ), ID(e), and ID( f ) using 2 lg n + O(c lg k) bits in total, as follows:
-the coordinates on which y and g appear, taking 2c bits.
-the value of y using Huffman coding. Specifically, we consider the projection of all n keys on the coordinates of y. In this distribution, y has frequency C(y) n , so its Huffman code will use lg n C(y) + O(1) bits. -the value of g using Huffman coding. This uses lg n C(g) + O(1) bits. -if C(y) ≤ C(g), we write x i and x i+1 . Each of these requires log 2 C(y) bits, since y ⊂ x i , x i+1 and there are C(y) completions of y to a full key. Using an additional O(c lg k) bits, we can write e∩ x ≤i+1 and f ∩ x ≤i+1 . Remember that we already encoded g = e \ x ≤i+1 = f \ x ≤i+1 , so the decoder can recover e and f . -if C(g) < C(y), we write e and f , each requiring log 2 C(g) bits. Since we know y =x i \ (e ∪ f ), we can write x i using O(c lg k) bits: write the old characters outsidê x i , and which positions of e ∪ f to reuse inx i . We showedx i+1 ⊂ e ∪ f , so we can also write x i+1 using O(c lg k) .
Overall, the encoding uses space: lg n
Putting It Together
We now show how to obtain a saving of at least 4 3 lg n − O(c lg k) bits by a careful combination of these techniques. Recall that our starting point is three edges a 0 , a 1 , a 2 with h 0 (a 0 ) = h 0 (a 1 ) = h 0 (a 2 ). The walk x 1 , ..., x k+1 started with x 1 = a 0 and finished whenx k+1 = ∅. We will now involve the other starting edges a 1 and a 2 . The analysis will split into many cases, each ended by a '3'. Case 1. One of a 1 and a 2 Contains a Free Character. Let j ∈ {1, 2} such that a j ⊆ x ≤k . Let y 1 = a j . We consider a walk y 1 , y 2 , . . . along the edges of the obstruction.Let y i = y i \ x ≤k \ y ≤i be the free characters of y i (which also takes all x i 's into consideration). We stop the walk the first time we observeŷ +1 = ∅. This must occur, since the graph is finite and there are no leaves (nodes of degree one) in the obstruction. Thus, at the latest the walk stops when it repeats an edge.
We use the standard encoding for the second walk:
ID(y 1 );COLL(a 0 , y 1 ); ID(y 2 ); COLL(y 2 , y 1 ); . . . ;ID(y ); COLL(y −1 , y ); HASHES(h , y )
Note that every pair ID(y j ), COLL(y j−1 , y j ) saves ε bits, including the initial ID(y 1 ), COLL(a 0 , y 1 ). To end the walk, we can use one of the safe savings of Lemmas 4.2 and 4.3. These give a saving of 1 3 lg n − O(c lg( + k)) bits, by modifying only HASHES(h , y ) or ID(y ). These local changes cannot interfere with the first walk, so we can use any technique (including piggybacking) to save lg n − O(c log k) bits from the first walk. We obtain a total saving of 4 3 lg n − O(1), as required. We are left with the situation a 1 ∪ a 2 ⊆ x ≤k . This includes the case when a 1 and a 2 are actual edges seen in the walk x 1 , . . . , x k .
Let t j be the first time a j becomes known in the walk; that is, a j ⊆ x <t j but a j ⊆ x ≤t j . By symmetry, we can assume t 1 ≤ t 2 . We begin with two simple cases.
Case 2. For Some j ∈ {1, 2}, t j Is Even and t j < k. We will apply Lemma 4.4 and save lg n− O(c lg k) bits by modifying COLL(x t j , x t j +1 ). Since t j < k, this does not interact with safe savings at the end of the stream, so we get total saving of at least 4 3 lg n − O(c lg k).
We apply Lemma 4.4 on the keys e = a 0 and f = a j . We must first write ID(a j ), which takes O(c lg k) bits given x ≤k . We have a 0 ∪ a j ⊆ x ≤t j by definition of t j . Since a j ∩x t j = ∅ andx t j +1 ∩ (a j ∪ a 0 ) = ∅, the lemma applies.
Case 3. For Some j ∈ {1, 2}, t j Is Odd and a j \ x <t j −1 =x t j −1 x t j . This assumption is exactly what we need to apply Lemma 4.4 with e = a 0 and f = a j . Note that h 0 (e) = h 0 ( f ) and t j is odd, so the lemma modifies COLL(x t j −1 , x t j ). The lemma can be applied in conjunction with any safe saving, since the safe savings only require modifications to ID(x k ) or HASHES(h k , x k ).
We now deal with two cases when t 1 = t 2 (both being odd or even). These require a combination of piggybacking followed by safe-weak savings. Note that in the odd case, we may assume a 1 \ x <t−1 = a 2 \ x <t−1 =x t−1 x t (due to case 3), and in the even case we may assume t 1 = t 2 = k (due to case 2).
Case 4. t 1 = t 2 = t Is Odd and a 1 \ x <t−1 = a 2 \ x <t−1 =x t−1 x t . We first get a 1 and a 2 by piggybacking or odd-side saving. Let i be the largest value such that a 1 \x ≤i = a 2 \x ≤i . Since a 1 \ x <t−1 = a 2 \ x <t−1 , we have i ≤ t−3. The last key that piggybacking or odd-side saving can interfere with is x t−2 .
We will now use the safe-weak saving of Lemma 4.3 to encode ID(x t−1 ) and ID(x t ). The known characters are K = x <t−1 ∪ a 1 ∪ a 2 , so x t−1 x t ⊆ K. Lemma 4.3 codes both ID(x t−1 ) and ID(x t ) with 2 3 lg n+ O(c lg k) bits, which represents a saving of roughly 4 3 lg n over the original encoding of the two identities. We don't need any more savings from the rest of the walk after x t .
Case 5. t 1 = t 2 = k Is Even. Thus, k is even and the last characters of a 1 and a 2 are only revealed byx k . LEMMA 4.8. We can save 2 lg n − O(c lg k) bits by modifying HASHES(h k , x k ), unless both: (1) a 1 ∩x k = a 2 ∩x k ; and (2)x k \ x k+1 is the empty set or equal to a 1 ∩x k .
PROOF. The h 0 hash codes of the following three subkeys are known from the hash codes in x <k : a 1 ∩x k , a 2 ∩x k (both because we know h 0 (a 0 ) = h 0 (a 1 ) = h 0 (a 2 )), andx k \ x k+1 (since x k and x k+1 collide). If two of these subsets are distinct and nonempty, we can choose two characters α and β from their symmetric difference. We can encode all characters ofx k except for α and β, whose hash codes can be deduced for free.
Since a j ∩x k = in the current case, the situations when we can find two distinct nonempty sets are: (1) a 1 ∩x k = a 2 ∩x k ; or (2) a 1 ∩x k = a 2 ∩x k butx k \ x k+1 is nonempty and different from them.
From now on assume the lemma fails. We can still save lg n bits by modifying HASHES(h k , x k ). We reveal all hash codes ofx k , except for one position-character α ∈ a 1 ∩x k . We then specify ID(a 1 ), which takes O(c lg k) bits. The hash h 0 (α) can then be deduced from h 0 (a 1 ) = h 0 (a 0 ).
We will now apply piggybacking or odd-side saving to a 1 and a 2 . Let i be the largest value with a 1 \ x ≤i = a 2 \ x ≤i . Note that a 1 \ x <k = a 2 \ x <k , so i < k − 1. If i is odd, Lemma 4.5 (odd-side saving) can save lg n bits by modifying COLL(x i+1 , x i+2 ); this works since i + 2 ≤ k. If i is even, Lemma 4.6 (piggybacking) can give use ID(a) and ID(b ) at a negligible cost of O(c lg k) bits. This doesn't touch anything later than ID(x i+1 ), where i + 1 < k.
When we arrive at ID(x k ), we know the position characters K = x <k ∪ a 1 ∪ a 2 . This means that x k x k+1 ⊆ K, becausex k \ x k+1 is either empty or a subset of a 1 . Therefore, we can use weak-safe savings from Lemma 4.3 to code ID(x k ) in just 1 3 lg n + O(c lg k) bits. In total, we have save at least 4 3 lg n − O(c lg k) bits. It remains to deal with distinct t 1 , t 2 , that is, t 1 < t 2 ≤ k. If one of the numbers is even, it must be t 2 = k, and then t 1 must be odd (due to case 2). By Case 3, if t j is odd, we also know a j \ x <t j −1 =x t j −1 x t j . Since these cases need to deal with at least one odd t j , the following lemma will be crucial. LEMMA 4.9. If t j ≤ k is odd and a j \ x <t j −1 =x t j −1 x t j , we can code ID(x t j −1 ) and ID(x t j ) with 3 2 lg n + O(c lg k) bits in total.
PROOF. Consider the subkey y =x t j −1 \ x t j . We first specify the positions of y using c bits. If C(y) ≥ √ n, there are at most √ n possible choices of y, so we can specify y with 1 2 lg n bits. We can also identify x t j with lg n bits. Then ID(
If C(y) ≤ √ n, we first specify ID(x t j −1 ) with lg n bits. This gives us the subkey y ⊆ x t j −1 . Since a j \ x <t j −1 =x t j −1 x t j , it follows that y ⊂ a j . Thus, we can write ID(a j ) using lg C(y) ≤ lg 1 2 lg n bits. Since x t j ⊆ x ≤t j −1 ∪ a j , we get ID(x t j ) for an additional O(c lg k) bits. Case 6. Both t 1 and t 2 Are Odd, t 1 < t 2 < k, and for All j ∈ {1, 2}, a j \x <t j −1 =x t j −1 x t j . We apply Lemma 4.9 for both j = 1 and j = 2, and save lg n bits in coding ID(x t 1 −1 ), ID(x t 1 ), ID(x t 2 −1 ), and ID(x t 2 ). These are all distinct keys, because t 1 < t 2 and both are odd. Since t 2 < k, we can combine this with any safe saving. Case 7. t 2 = k Is Even and t 1 < k Is Odd with a 1 \ x <t 1 −1 =x t 1 −1 x t 1 . We apply Lemma 4.9 for j = 1, and save 1 2 lg n − O(c lg k) bits in coding ID(x t 1 −1 ), ID(x t 1 ). We also save lg n bits by modifying HASHES(h 0 , x k ). We reveal all hash codes ofx k , except for one position-character α ∈ a 2 ∩x k (which is a nonempty set since t 2 = k). We then specify ID(a 2 ), which takes O(c lg k) bits. The hash h 0 (α) can then be deduced from h 0 (a 2 ) = h 0 (a 0 ).
Case 8. Both t 1 and t 2 Are Odd, t 1 < t 2 = k, and for All j ∈ {1, 2}, a j \x <t j −1 =x t j −1 x t j . To simplify notation, let t 1 = t. This case is the most difficult. If we can apply strongsafe saving as in Lemma 4.2, we save lg n by modifying HASHES(h k , x k ). We also save lg n by two applications of Lemma 4.9, coding ID(x t−1 ), ID(x t ), ID(x k−1 ), and ID(x k ). These don't interact since t < k and both are odd.
The strong-safe saving fails ifx k ⊂ x k+1 . We will attempt to piggyback for x k and x k+1 . Let i be the largest value such that x k \ x ≤i = x k+1 \ x ≤i . If i is even, we get an odd-side saving of lg n (Lemma 4.5). Since this does not affect any identities, we can still apply Lemma 4.9 to save 1 2 lg n on the identities ID(x t−1 ) and ID(x t ). Now assume i is odd. We have real piggybacking, which may affect the coding of ID(x i ), ID(x i+1 ) and ID(x k ). Since both i and t are odd, there is at most one common key between {x i , x i+1 } and {x t−1 , x t }. We consider two cases:
After piggybacking, which in particular encodes x t , we can encode ID(x t−1 ) in lg n C(y) + O(c lg k) bits. Indeed, we can write the positions of y with c bits and then the identity of y using Huffman coding for all subkeys on those positions. Finally the identity of
As before, we can write ID(x t ) using lg n C(y) + O(c lg k) bits, after piggybacking.
If C(y) ≥ n 1/3 , we have obtained a total saving of 4 3 lg n − O(c lg k): a logarithmic term for ID(x k ) from piggybacking, and 1 3 lg n for ID(x t−1 ) or ID(x t ). Now assume that C(y) ≤ n 1/3 . In this case, we do not use piggybacking. Instead, we use a variation of Lemma 4.9 to encode ID(x t−1 ) and ID(x t ). First we code the one containing y with lg n bits. Since a 1 \ x <t−1 =x t−1 x t , and therefore y ⊂ a 1 , we have y ⊂ a 1 . We code ID(a 1 ) with lg C(y) ≤ 1 3 lg n bits. We obtain the other key among x t−1 and x t using O(c lg k) bits, since all its characters are known. Thus we have coded ID(x t−1 ) and ID(x t ) with 4 3 lg n + O(c lg k) bits, for a saving of roughly 2 3 lg n bits. Next we consider the coding of ID(x k−1 ) and ID(x k ). We know that a 2 \x <k−1 =x k−1 x k andx k ⊂ x k+1 . Lemma 4.9 would guarantee a saving of 1 2 lg n bits. However, we will perform an analysis as shown, obtaining a saving of 2 3 lg n bits. Let y =x k−1 \ x k . First assume C(y) ≥ n 1/3 . We use the safe-weak saving of Lemma 4.3 to encode ID(x k ) using 2 3 lg n bits. We then encode the subkey y using lg n C(y) + O(c) ≤ 2 3 lg n + O(c) bits, and finally x k−1 using O(c lg k) bits. This obtains both ID(x k−1 ) and ID(x k ) using 4 3 lg n + O(c lg k) bits. Now assume C(y) ≤ n 1/3 . We first code ID(x k−1 ) using lg n bits. This gives us y for the price of c bits. But a 2 \ x <k−1 =x k−1 x k , so y ⊂ a 2 , and we can code ID(a 2 ) using lg C(y) ≤ 1 3 lg n bits. Then ID(x k ) can be coded with O(c lg k) bits. Again, we obtain both ID(x k−1 ) and ID(x k ) for the price of 4 3 lg n + O(c lg k) bits. This completes our analysis of cuckoo hashing. 
MINWISE INDEPENDENCE
For any set S of n keys and any key q ∈ S, we will prove that:
The lower bound is relatively simple, and is shown in Section 5.1. The upper bound is significantly more involved and appears in Section 5.2. For the sake of the analysis, we divide the output range [0, 1) into n bins, where = γ lg n for a large enough constant γ . Of particular interest is the minimum bin [0, n ). We choose γ sufficiently large for the Chernoff bounds of Theorem 1.1 to guarantee that the minimum bin in nonempty with high probability: Pr min h(S) < n ≥ 1 − 1 n 2 . In Section 5.1 and Section 5.2, we assume that hash values h(x) are binary fractions of infinite precision (hence, we can ignore collisions). It is easy to see that (18) continues to hold when the hash codes have 1 + 1 c lg n bits, even if ties are resolved adversarially. Leth be a truncation to 1 + 1 c lg n bits of the infinite-precision h. We only have a distinction between the two functions if q is the minimum and (∃)x ∈ S :h(x) =h(q). The probability of a distinction is bounded from above:
We used 2-independence to conclude that {h(q) < n } and {h(x) =h(q)} are independent.
Both the lower and upper bounds start by expressing:
For truly random hash functions, Pr[ p < min h(S) | h(q) = p] = (1 − p) n , since each element has an independent probability of 1 − p of landing about p.
Lower Bound
For a lower bound, it suffices to look at the case when q lands in the minimum bin:
We will now aim to understand f ( p) for p ∈ [0, n ]. In the analysis, we will fix the hash codes of various position-characters in the order ≺ given by Lemma 2.5. Let h(≺ α) done the choice for all position-characters β ≺ α. Remember that ≺ starts by fixing the characters of q first, so: q 1 ≺ · · · ≺ q c ≺ α 0 ≺ α 1 ≺ · · · Start by fixing h(q 1 ), . . . , h(q c ) subject to h(q) = x.
When it is time to fix some position-character α, the hash code of any key x ∈ G α is a constant depending on h(≺ α) xor the random quantity h(α). This final xor makes h(x) uniform in [0, 1). Thus, for any choice of h(≺ α),
This implies that:
To bound this product from below, we use the following lemma.
PROOF. First, we note a simple proof for the weaker statement (1 − pk) < (1 − p) (1+ pk)k . However, it will be crucial for our later application of the lemma that we can avoid the ceiling.
Consider t Bernoulli trials, each with success probability p. The probability of no failures occurring is (1− p) t . By the inclusion-exclusion principle, applied to the second level, this is bounded from above by:
Thus, 1 − kp can be bounded from below by the probability that no failure occurs amount t Bernoulli trials with success probability p, for t satisfying t· (1 − pt 2 ) ≥ k. This holds for t ≥ (1 + kp)k.
We have just shown 1 − p · k > (1 − p) (1+ pk)k . Removing the ceiling requires an "inclusion-exclusion" inequality with a non-integral number of experiments t. Such an inequality was shown by Gerber [1968] : (1 − p) t ≤ 1 − αt + (αt) 2 /2, even for fractional t. Setting t = (1 + pk)k, our result is a corollary of Gerber's inequality:
The lemma applies in our setting, since p < n = O( lg n n ) and all groups are bounded |G α | ≤ 2 · n 1−1/c . Note that p · |G α | ≤ n · 2n 1−1/c = O( /n 1/c ). Plugging into (19):
Let m = n · (1 + /n 1/c ). The final result follows by integration over p:
Upper Bound
As in the lower bound, it will suffice to look at the case when q lands in the minimum bin:
To bound f ( p), we will fix position-characters in the order ≺ from Lemma 2.5, subject to h(q) = p. In the lower bound, we could analyze the choice of h(α) even for the worst-case choice of h(≺ α). Indeed, no matter how the keys in G α arranged themselves, when shifted randomly by h(α), they failed to land below p with probability
For an upper bound, we need to prove that keys from G α do land below p often enough: o(1) )|G α | . However, a worst-case arrangement of G α could make all keys equal, which would give the terrible bound of just 1 − p.
To refine the analysis, we can use Lemma 2.2, which says that for d = O(1), all groups G α are d-bounded with probability ≥ 1 − 1 n 2 . If G α is d-bounded, its keys cannot cluster in less than |G α |/d different bins.
When a group G α has more than one key in some bin, we pick one of them as a representative, by some arbitrary (but fixed) tie-breaking rule. Let R α be the set of representatives of G α . Observe that the set R α ⊆ G α is decided once we condition on h(≺ α). Indeed, the hash codes for keys in G α are decided up to a shift by h(α), and this common shift cannot change how keys cluster into bins. We obtain:
To conclude Pr[ p < min h(R α )] = 1 − p|R α | we used that the representatives are in different bins, so at most one can land below p.
Unfortunately, this is a far cry from the desired exponent, |G α | · 1 − O(n −1/c ) .
To get a sharper bound, we will need a dynamic view of the representatives. After fixing h(≺ α), we know whether two keys x and y collide whenever the symmetric difference x y = (x \ y) ∪ (y \ x) consists only of position-characters ≺ α. Define R β (α) to be our understanding of the representatives R β just before character α is revealed: from any subset of G β that is known to collide, we select only one key. After the query characters get revealed, we don't know of any collisions yet (we know only one character per position), so R β (α 0 ) = G β . The set of representatives decreases in time, as we learn about more collisions, and R β (β) = R β is the final value (revealing β doesn't change the clustering of G β ).
Let C(α) be the number of key pairs (x, y) from the same group G β (β α) such that α = max ≺ (x y). These are the pairs whose collisions is decided when h(α) is revealed, since h(α) is the last unknown hash code in the keys, besides the common ones. Let α + be the successor of α in the order ≺. Consider the total number of representatives before and after h(α) is revealed: β |R β (α)| versus β |R β (α + )|. The maximum change between these quantities is ≤ C(α), while the expected change is ≤ C(α) · n . This is because h(α) makes every pair (x, y) collide with probability n , regardless of the previous hash codes in (x y) \ {α}. Note, however, that the number of colliding pairs may overestimate the decrease in the representatives if the same key is in multiple pairs.
Let n( α) = β α |G α | and define n( α) similarly. Our main inductive claim is:
LEMMA 5.2. For any setting h(≺ α) such that h(q) = p and β α |R β (α)| = r, we have:
where we define P (α, p, r) 
As the definition P(α, p, r) may look intimidating, we first try to demystify it, while giving a sketch for the lemma's proof (the formal proof appears in Section 5.3.) The lemma looks at the worst-case probability, over prior choices h(≺ α), that p = h(q) remains the minimum among groups G α , G α + , . . . . After seeing the prior hash codes, the number of representatives in these groups is r = β α |R β (α)|. In the ideal case when h(α), h(α + ), . . . do not introduce any additional collisions, we have r representatives that could beat p for the minimum. As argued above, the probability that p is smaller than all these representatives is ≤ (1 − p) r . Thus, the first term of P(α, p, r) accounts for the ideal case when no more collisions occur.
On the other hand, the factor (1 − p) n( α)/(2d) accounts for the worst case, with no guarantee on the representatives except that the groups are d-bounded (the 2 in the exponent is an artifact). Thus, P(α, p, r) interpolates between the best case and the worst case. This is explained by a convexity argument: the bound is maximized when h(α) mixes among two extreme strategies -it creates no more collisions, or creates the maximum it could.
It remains to understand the weight attached to the worst-case probability. After fixing h(α), the maximum number of remaining representatives isr = β α |R β (α)|. The expected number is ≥r − C(α) n , since every collision happens with probability n . By a Markov bound, the worst case (killing most representatives) can only happen with probability O n C(α) r . The weight of the worst case follows byr ≥ n( α)/d and letting these terms accrue in the induction for β α.
Deriving the Upper Bound. We now prove the upper bound on Pr[h(q) < h(S)] assuming Lemma 5.2. Let α 0 be the first position-character fixed after the query. Since fixing the query cannot eliminate representatives,
PROOF. We will prove that A = β α 0 C(β) n( β) ≤ n 1−1/c · H n , where H n is the Harmonic number.
Consider all pairs (x, y) from the same group G γ , and order them by β = max ≺ (x y). This is the time when the pair gets counted in some C(β) as a potential collision. The contribution of the pair to the sum is 1/n( β), so this contribution is maximized if β immediately precedes γ in the order ≺. That is, the sum is maximized when C(β) = |G β + | 2
. We obtain A ≤ β
In this sum, each key x ∈ G β contributes 1/n( β), which is bounded by one over the number of keys following x. Thus, A ≤ H n .
To achieve our original goal, bounding Pr[h(q) < h(S)], we proceed as follows:
By Lemma 2.2, all groups are d-bounded with probability 1 − 1 n 2 . We also have
Thus:
Proof of Lemma 5.2
Recall that we are fixing some choice of h(≺ α) and bounding:
If for some β, |R β (α)| < |G β |/d, it means not all groups are d-bounded, so A = 0. If all groups are d-bounded and we finished fixing all position-characters, A = 1. These form the base cases of our induction. The remainder of the proof is the inductive step. We first break the probability into:
As h(α) is uniformly random, each representative in R α has a probability of p of landing below p. These events are disjoint because p is in the minimum bin, so
After using R α , we are left withr = r − |R α | = β α |R β (α)| representatives. After h(α) is chosen, some of the representative ofr are lost. Define the random variable = β α |R β (α)| − |R β (α + )| to measure this loss. Let max ≥r− n( α) d be a value to be determined. We only need to consider ≤ max . Indeed, if more than max representatives are lost, we are left with less than n( α)/d representatives, so some group is not d-bounded, and the probability is zero. We can now bound A 2 by the induction hypothesis:
Observe that the second term of P(α + , p,r − δ) does not depend on δ so:
It remains to bound A 3 . We observe that (1 − p)ˆr −δ is convex in δ, so its achieves the maximum value if all the probability mass of is on 0 and max , subject to preserving the mean.
OBSERVATION 5.4. We have:
PROOF. As discussed earlier, a representative disappears when we have a pair x, y ∈ R β (α) that lands in the same bin due to h(α). This can only happen if (x, y) is counted in C(α), that is, α = max ≺ (x y). If h(α) is uniform, such a pair (x, y) collides with probability n , regardless of h(≺ α). By linearity of expectation,
However, we have to condition on the event p > min h(G α ), which makes h(α) nonuniform. Since p < n and |G α | ≤ n 1−1/c , we have Pr[p < min h(G α )] < 1/2. Therefore, conditioning on this event can at most double the expectation of positive random variables.
A bound on A 3 can be obtained by assuming Pr[ = max ] = 2 · C(α) · n max , and all the rest of the mass is on = 0. This gives:
Remember that we promised to choose max ≥r − n( α) d . We now fix max =r − n( α) 2d . We are guaranteed thatr ≥ n( α) d , since otherwise some group is not d-bounded. This means max ≥ n( α) 2d . We have obtained a bound on A 3 :
This completes the proof of Lemma 5.2, and the bound on minwise independence.
FOURTH MOMENT BOUNDS
Consider distributing a set S of n balls into m bins truly randomly. Here we let each ball have a weight of w i . These weights are crusial for the application in [Thorup 2009 ] mentioned in the introduction. We designate a query ball q / ∈ S, and let W be the total weight of the elements landing in bin F(h(q)), where F is an arbitrary function. With μ = E[W] = 1 m w i , we are interested in the 4th moment of the bin size: E[(W − μ) 4 ]. Let X i be the indicator that ball i ∈ S lands in bin F(h(q)), and let
The terms in which some element appears exactly once are zero.
Thus, the only nonzero terms arise from:
-four copies of one element (i = j = k = l), giving the term 1 m ± O( 1 m 2 ) w 4 i . -two distinct elements s = t, each appearing twice. There are 4 2 = 6 terms for each s, t pair, and each term is O 1
This gives the standard 4th moment bound:
This bound holds even if balls are distributed by 5-independent hashing: the balls in any 4-tuple hit the bin chosen by h(q) independently at random. On the other hand, with 4-independent hashing, this bound can fail quite badly [Pǎtraşcu and Thorup 2010] .
If the distribution of balls into bins is achieved by simple tabulation, we will show a slightly weaker version of (21):
In Section 6.1, we show how to analyze the 4th moment of a fixed bin (which requires 4-independence by standard techniques). Our proof is a combinatorial reduction to Cauchy-Schwarz. In Section 6.2, we let the bin depend on the hash code h(q). This requires 5-independence by standard techniques. To handle tabulation hashing, Section 6.3 shows a surprising result: among any 5 keys, at least one hashes independently of the rest.
We note that the bound on the 4th moment of a fixed bin has been indendently discovered by Braverman et al. [2010] in a different context. However, that work is not concerned with a query-dependent bin, which is the most surprising part of our proof.
Fourth Moment of a Fixed Bin
We now attempt to bound the terms of (20) in the case of simple tabulation. Since simple tabulation is 3-independent [Wegman and Carter 1981] , any terms that involve only 3 distinct keys (i.e., |{i, j, k, l}| ≤ 3) have the same expected value as established above. Thus, we can bound:
Unlike the case of 4-independence, the contribution from distinct i, j, k, l will not be zero. We begin with the following simple bound on each term.
. Note that Z is only positive when an even number of the four X 's are 1:
(1) the case X i = X j = X k = X l = 1 only happens with probability 1 m 3 by 3independence. The contribution to Z is (1 − 1 m ) 4 < 1.
(2) the case of two 1's and two 0's happens with probability at most 4 2 1 m 2 , and contributes 1 m 2 (1 − 1 m ) 2 < 1 m 2 to Z . (3) the case of X i = X j = X k = X l = 0 contributes 1 m 4 to Z . Thus, the first case dominates and E[Z ] = O 1 m 3 . If one of {i, j, k, l} contains a unique position-character, its hash code is independent of the other three. In this case, the term is zero, as the independent key factors out of the expectation and E[Y i ] = 0. We are left with analyzing 4-tuples with no unique position-characters; let A ⊆ S 4 contain all such 4-tuples. Then:
Imagine representing a tuple from A as a 4 × q matrix, with every key represented in a row. There are four types of columns that we may see: columns that contain a single character in all rows (type 1), and columns that contain two distinct characters, each appearing in two rows (type j ∈ {2, 3, 4} means that row j has the same character as row 1). According to this classification, there are 4 q possible matrix types. LEMMA 6.2. Fix a fixed matrix type, and let B ⊆ A contain all tuples conforming to this type. Then, (i, j,k,l) 
PROOF. We first group keys according to their projection on the type-1 characters. We obtain a partition of the keys S = S 1 ∪ S 2 ∪ · · · such that S t contains keys that are identical in the type-1 coordinates. Tuples that conform to the fixed matrix type, (i, j, k, l) ∈ B, must consist of four keys from the same set, that is, i, j, k, l ∈ S t . We analyze each S t separately and bound the tuples from (S t ) 4 by i∈S t w 2 i 2 . This implies the lemma by convexity, as t i∈S t w 2
For the remainder, fix some S t . If |S t | < 4, there is nothing to prove. Otherwise, there must exist at least one character of type different from 1, differentiating the keys. By permuting the set {i, j, k, l}, we may assume a type-2 character exists. Group keys according to their projection on all type-2 characters. We obtain a partition of the keys S t = T 1 ∪ T 2 ∪ · · · such that T a contains keys that are identical in the type-2 coordinates.
A type-conforming tuple (i, j, k, l) ∈ B must satisfy i, j ∈ T a and k, l ∈ T b for a = b . We claim a stronger property: for any i, j ∈ T a and every b = a, there exists at most one pair k, l ∈ T b completing a valid tuple (i, j, k, l) ∈ B. Indeed, for type-1 coordinates, k and l must be identical to i on that coordinate. For type 3 and 4 coordinates, k and l must reuse the characters from i and j (k ← i, l ← j for type 3; k ← j, l ← i for type 4).
Let X ⊂ (T a ) 2 contain the pairs i, j ∈ T a which can be completed by one pair k, l ∈ T b . Let Y ⊂ (T b ) 2 contain the pairs k, l ∈ T b which can be completed by i, j ∈ T a . There is a bijection between X and Y ; let it be f : X → Y . We can now apply the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality: (i, j,k,l) 
Thus, the equation is further bounded by i∈T a w 2 i k∈T b w 2 k . Summing up over all T a and T b , we obtain: (i, j,k,l) 
share that position-character. If i, j, and q contain two distinct distinct characters on some positon, k must contain the one that appears once. This determines k.
For any i and j, we see exactly one set {i, j, k} that leads to bad tuples. By an infinitesimal perturbation of the weights, each such set leads to 4 2 = 6 tuples: we have to choose two positions for i, and then j is the remaining key with larger weight. Thus, the total contribution of all terms (i, j, k, l) with 3 distinct keys is
This completes the proof of (22).
Independence among Five Keys
The section is dedicated to proving Theorem 6.3. We first observe the following immediate fact.
FACT 6.6. If, restricting to a subset of the characters (matrix columns), a key x ∈ X hashes independently from X \ {x}, then it also hashes independently when considering all characters.
If some key contains a unique character, we are done by peeling. Otherwise, each column contains either a single value in all five rows, or two distinct values: one appearing in two rows, and one in three rows. By Fact 6.6, we may ignore the columns containing a single value. For the columns containing two values, relabel the value appearing three times with 0, and the one appearing twice with 1. By Fact 6.6 again, we may discard any duplicate column, leaving at most 5 2 distinct columns. Since the columns have weight 2, the Hamming distance between two columns is either 2 or 4. LEMMA 6.7. If two columns have Hamming distance 4, one hash value is independent.
PROOF. By Fact 6.6, we ignore all other columns. Up to reordering of the rows, the matrix is: ⎡
By 3-independence of character hashing, keys 1, 3, and 5 are independent. But keys 2 and 4 are identical to keys 1 and 3. Thus, key 5 is independent from the rest.
We are left with the case where all column pairs have Hamming distance 2. By reordering of the rows, the two columns look like the matrix in (a) below. Then, there exist only two column vectors that are at distance two from both of the columns in (a):
If the matrix does not contain column (b), then keys 4 and 5 are identical, a contradiction. Thus, the matrix must contain columns (a) and (b), with (c) being optional. If (c) appears, discard it by Fact 6.6. We are left with the matrix:
Now, observe that the hash code of row 1 is just the xor of the hash codes of rows 2-4, h(1) = h(2) ⊕ h C (3) ⊕ h C (4). Indeed, the codes of the one characters in each column cancel out, leaving us with an xor of the zeros in each column. We claim that row 5 is independent of rows 2-4. This immediately implies that row 5 is independent of all others, since row 1 is just a function of rows 2-4.
Independence of row 5 from rows 2-4 follows by peeling. Each of rows 2, 3, and 4 have a position character not present in 5, so they are independent of 5. This completes the proof of Theorem 6.3.
Linear Probing with Fourth Moment Bounds
As in Section 3, we study linear probing with n stored keys in a table of size m, and a query q not among the stored keys. We define the load factor α = n/m and ε = 1 − α. Pagh et al. [2009] presented a proof that with 5-independent hashing, the expected number probes is O(1/ε 13/6 ). We will here improve this to the optimal O(1/ε 2 ), which is optimal even for a fully random hash function. For the case of smaller load factor, where α ≤ 1/2, Thorup [2009] proved that the expected number of filled entries probes is O(α) which is optimal even for fully random functions.
As discussed in Section 3, our goal is to study the length L of the longest filled interval containing a point p which may depend on h(q), for example, p = h(q). To bound the probability that an interval I is full, we study more generally the case how the number X I of keys hashed to I deviates from the mean α|I|: if I is full, the deviation is by more than εα|I|.
As we mentioned earlier, as an initial step Pagh et al. [2009] proved that if we consider the number of keys X I in an interval I that may depend on the hash of a query key, then we have the following 4th unweighted moment bound:
This is an unweighted version of (22) so (23) holds both with 5-independent hashing and with simple tabulation hashing. As with our simple tabulation hashing, for each i, we consider the event C i,δ, p that for some point p that may depend on the hash of the query key, there is some an interval I p, 2 i ≤ |I| < 2 i+1 with relative deviation δ. In perfect generalization of (23), we will show that (23) implies
First, consider the simple case where δ ≥ 1. We apply Claim 3.1.1. Since δ ≥ 1, we get j = i − 3. The event C i,δ, p implies that one of the 2 5 + 1 relevant j-bins has 1 + δ 2 α2 j keys. By (23), the probability of this event is bounded by
This completes the proof of (24) when δ ≥ 1. Now consider the case where δ ≤ 1. If α2 i ≤ 1, (24) does not give a probability bound below 1, so we can assume α2 i > 1. Then, (24) simplifies to
This time we will apply Claim 3.1.2. Recall that a j-bin is dangerous for level i if its absolute deviation is j,i = δα2 i 24 /2 (i− j)/5 . We defined j 0 be the smallest nonnegative integer satisfying j 0 ,i ≤ α2 j 0 . If C i,δ, p happens, then for some j ∈ { j 0 , ..., i}, one of the 2 i− j+2 + 1 relevant j-bins is dangerous for level i. By (23), the probability of this event is bounded by i j= j 0 O(P j ) where
Let j 1 = log 2 (1/α) . Note that j 1 ≤ i. For j ≥ j 1 , we have α2 j + (α2 j ) 2 = O((α2 j ) 2 ), so
. We see that for j ≥ j 1 , the bound decreases exponentially with j, so i j= j 1
This is the desired bound from (25) for Pr [C i,δ, p ], so we are done if j 1 ≤ j 0 . However, suppose j 0 < j 1 . By definition, we have α2 j 1 ≤ 1 and i, j 1 ≤ 1, so
This means that there is nothing to prove, for with (26), we conclude that 1/(δ 4 (α2 i ) 2 ) = (1). Therefore, (25) does not promise any probability below 1. This completes the proof of (24). As in Theorem 3.1, we can consider the more general event D ,δ, p that there exists an interval I containing p and of length at least such that the number of keys X I in I deviates at least δ from the mean. Then, as a perfect generalization of (24), we get
In the case of linear probing with load factor α = 1 − ε, we worry about filled intervals. Let L be the length of the longest full interval containing the hash of a query key. For ε ≤ 1/2 and α ≥ 1/2, we use δ = ε and
improving the O(1/ε 13 6 ) bound from Pagh et al. [2009] . However, contrasting the bounds with simple tabulation, the concentration from (27) does not work well for higher moments, for example, the variance bound we get with ε = 1/2 is O(log n), and for larger moment p ≥ 3, we only get a bound of O(n p /(n 2 )) = O(n p−2 ). Now consider α ≤ 1/2. We use δ = 1/(2α) noting that (1 + δ)α|I| = (α + 1/2)|I| < |I|. Then
In particular, as promised in (16), we have
More generally for the mean,
This reproves the bound from Thorup [2009] .
EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
In this section, we make some simple experiments comparing simple tabulation with other hashing schemes, both on their own, and in applications. Most of our experiments are the same as those in Thorup and Zhang [2012] except that we here include simple tabulation whose relevance was not realized in Thorup and Zhang [2012] . We will also consider Cuckoo hashing which was not considered in Thorup and Zhang [2012] .
Recall the basic message of our paper that simple tabulation in applications shares many of the strong mathematical properties normally associated with an independence of at least 5. For example, when used in linear probing, the expected number of probes is constant for any set of input keys. With sufficiently random input, this expected constant is obtained by any universal hashing scheme [Mitzenmacher and Vadhan 2008] , but other simple schemes fail on simple structured inputs like dense intervals or arithmetic progressions, which could easily occur in practice [ Thorup and Zhang 2012] .
Our experiments consider two issues. -How fast is simple tabulation compared with other realistic hashing schemes on random input? In this case, the quality of the hash function doesn't matter, and we are only comparing their speed. -What happens to the quality on structured input. We consider the case of dense intervals, and also the hypercube which we believe should be the worst input for simple tabulation since it involves the least amount of randomness.
We will now briefly review the hashing schemes considered in our experiments. The focus will be on the common cases of 32 and 64 bit keys. If the initial keys are much bigger, we can typically first apply universal hashing to get down to a smaller domain, for example, collision free down to a domain of size n 2 . To achieve expected O(1) time for linear probing, it suffices to map universally to a domain of just O(n) [Thorup 2009 ].
Multiplication-Shift Hashing
The fastest known hashing schemes are based on a multiplication followed by a shift.
Univ-mult-shift. If we are satisfied with plain universal hashing, then as shown in Dietzfelbinger et al. [1997] , we pick a random odd number a from the same -bit domain as the keys. If the desired output is out -bit keys, we compute the universal hash function:
This expression should be interpreted according to the C programming language. In particular, * denotes standard computer multiplication where the result is truncated to the same size as that of its largest operand. Here this means multiplication modulo 2 . Also, >> is a right shift taking out least significant bits. Mathematically, this is integer division by 2 − out . Note that this scheme is far from 2-independent, for example, if two keys differ in only their most significant bit, then so does their hash values. However, the scheme is universal which suffices, say, for expected constant times in chaining.
2-indep-mult-shift.
For 2-independent hashing, we use the scheme from Dietzfelbinger [1996] . We pick a random 2 -bit multiplier a (which does not need to be odd), and a 2 bit number b . Now we compute: This works fine with a single 64-bit multiplication when = 32. For = 64, we would need to simulate 128-bit multiplication. In this case, we have a faster alternative used for string hashing [Thorup 2009 ], viewing the key x as consisting of two 32-bit keys x 1 and x 2 . For a 2-independent 32-bit output, we pick three random 64-bit numbers a 1 and a 2 and b , and compute h a 1 ,a 2 ,b (x 1 x 2 ) = ((a 1 +x 2 )*(a 2 +x 1 )+b )>>32.
Concatenating two such values, we get a 64-bit 2-independent hash value using just two 64-bit multiplications.
Polynomial Hashing
For general k-independent hashing, we have the classic implementation of Wegman and Carter [1981] by a degree k − 1 polynomial over some prime field:
for some prime p 2 out with each a i picked randomly from [ p] . If p is an arbitrary prime, this method is fairly slow because 'mod p' is slow. However, Carter and Wegman [1979] pointed out that we can get a fast implementation using shifts and bitwise Boolean operations if p is a so-called Mersenne prime of the form 2 i − 1.
5-Indep-Mersenne-Prime.
We use the above scheme for 5-independent hashing. For 32-bit keys, we use p = 2 61 − 1, and for 64-bit keys, we use p = 2 89 − 1.
For the practical implementation, recall that standard 64-bit multiplication on computers discards overflow beyond the 64 bits. For example, this implies that we may need four 64-bit multiplications just to implement a full multiplication of two numbers from [2 61 − 1]. This is why specialized 2-independent schemes are much faster. Unfortunately, we do not know a practical generalization for higher independence.
Tabulation-Based Hashing
The basic idea in tabulation based schemes is to replace multiplications with lookups in tables that are small enough to fit in fast memory. Table. Simple tabulation is the basic example of tabulation based hashing.
Simple-
A key x = x 1 · · · x c is divided into c characters. For i = 1 · · c, we have a table H i providing a random value H i [x i ] with a random value, and then we just return the xor of all the H i [x i ]. Since the tables are small, it is easy to populate them with random data (e.g. based on atmospheric noise http://random.org). Simple tabulation is only 3-independent.
We are free to chose the size of the character domain, for example, we could use 16-bit characters instead of 8-bit characters, but then the tables would not fit in the fast L1 cache. The experiments from Thorup and Zhang [2012] indicate that 8-bit characters give much better performance, and that is what we use here. Table. To get higher independence, we can compute some additional "derived characters" and use them to index into new tables, like the regular characters. Thorup and Zhang Thorup and Zhang [2012] presented a fast such scheme for 5-independent hashing. With c = 2 characters, they simply use the derived character x 1 + x 2 . For c > 2, this generalizes with c − 1 derived characters and a total of 2c − 1 lookups for 5-independent hashing. The scheme is rather complicated to implement, but runs well.
5-Indep-TZ-

Hashing in Isolation
Our first goal is to time the different hashing schemes when run in isolation. We want to know how simple tabulation compares in speed to the fast multiplication-shift schemes and to the 5-independent schemes whose qualities it shares. We compile and run the same C code on two different computers:
-32-bit computer. Single-core Intel Xeon 3.2GHz 32-bit processor with 2048KB cache, 32-bit addresses and libraries. -64-bit computer. Dual-core Intel Xeon 2.6GHz 64-bit processor with 4096KB cache, 64-bit addresses and libraries.
Table I presents the timings for the different hashing schemes, first mapping 32-bit keys to 32-bit values, second mapping 64-bit keys to 64-bit values.
Not surprisingly, we see that the 64-bit computer benefits more than the 32-bit computer when 64-bit multiplications is critical; namely in univ-mult-shift for 64 bits, 2-indep-mult-shift, and 5-indep-Mersenne-prime.
As mentioned, the essential difference between our experiments and those in Thorup and Zhang [2012] is that simple tabulation is included, and our interest here is how it performs relative to the other schemes. In the case of 32-bits keys, we see that in both computers, the performance of simple tabulation is similar to 2-indep-multshift. Also, not surprisingly, we see that it is more than twice as fast as the much more complicated 5-indep-TZ-table.
When we go to 64-bits, it may be a bit surprising that simple tabulation becomes more than twice as slow, for we do exactly twice as many look-ups. However, the space is quadrupled with twice as many tables, each with twice as big entries, moving up from 1KB to 8KB, so the number of cache misses may increase.
Comparing simple tabulation with the 2-indep-mult-shift, we see that it is faster on the 32-bit computer and less than twice as slow on the 64-bit computer. We thus view it as competitive in speed.
The competitiveness of simple tabulation compared with multiplication-shift based methods agrees with the experiments of Thorup [2000] from more than 10 years ago on older computer architectures. The experiments from Thorup [2000] did not include schemes of higher independence.
The competitiveness of our cache based simple tabulation with multiplication-shift based methods is to be expected both now and in the future. One can always imagine that multiplication becomes faster than cache, and vice versa. However, most data processing involves frequent cache and memory access. Therefore, even if it was technically possible, it would normally wasteful to configure a computer with much faster multiplication than cache. Conversely, however, there is lot of data processing that does not use multiplication, so it is easier to imagine real computers configured with faster cache than multiplication.
Concerning hardware, we note that simple tabulation is ideally suited for parallel lookups of the characters of a key. Also, the random data in the character tables are only changed rarely in connection with a rehash. Otherwise, we only read the tables, which means that we could potentially have them stored in simpler and faster EEP-ROM. This would also avoid conflicts with other applications in cache. Given our high probability bounds, a megabyte of hardwired random numbers would probably last for a lifetime of simple tabulation character tables.
Linear Probing
We now consider what happens when we use the different hashing schemes with linear probing. In this case, the hash function needs good random properties are need for good performance on worst-case input. We consider 2 20 32-bit keys in a table with 2 21 entries. The table therefore uses 8MB space, which does not fit in the cache of either computer, so there will be competition for the cache. Each experiment averaged the update time over 10 million insert/delete cycles. For each input type, we ran 100 such experiments on the same input but with different random seeds for the hash functions.
Random Input. First we consider the case of a random input, where the randomization properties of the hash function are irrelevant. This means that the focus is on speed just like when we ran the experiments in isolation. Essentially, the cost per update should be that of computing the hash value, as in Table I , plus a common additive -TZ-table  177  211  simple-table  149  166 The time is averaged over 10 million updates to set with 1 million keys in a linear probing table with 2 million entries.
cost: a random access to look up the hash entry plus a number of sequential probes. The average number of probes per update was tightly concentrated around 3.28 for all schemes, deviating by less than 0.02 over the 100 experiments. An interesting new issue is that the different schemes now have to compete with the linear probing table for the cache. In particular, this could hurt the tabulation based schemes. Another issue is that when schemes are integrated with an application, the optimizing compiler may have many more opportunities for pipelining etc. The results for random input are presented in Table II . Within the 100 experiments, the deviation for each data point was less than 1%, and here we just present the mean.
Compared with Table I , we see that our 32-bit computer performs better than the 64-bit computer on linear probing. In Table I we had that the 64-bit processor was twice as fast at the hash computations based on 64-bit multiplication, but in Table II , when combined with linear probing, we see that it is only faster in the most extreme case of 5-indep-Mersenne-prime. One of the more surprising outcomes is that 5-indep-Mersenne-prime is so slow compared with the tabulation based schemes on the 64-bit computer. We had expected the tabulation based schemes to take a hit from cache competition, but the effect appears to be minor.
The basic outcome is that simple tabulation in linear probing with random input is competitive with the fast multiplication-shift based scheme and about 20% faster than the fastest 5-independent scheme (which is much more complicated to implement). We note that we cannot hope for a big multiplicative gain in this case, since the cost is dominated by the common additive cost from working the linear probing table itself.
Structured Input. We now consider the case where the input keys are structured in the sense of being drawn in random order from a dense interval: a commonly occurring case in practice which is known to cause unreliable performance for most simple hashing schemes [Pagh et al. 2009 ; Pǎtraşcu and Thorup 2010; Thorup and Zhang 2012] . The results are shown in Figure 2 . For each hashing scheme, we present the average number of probes for each of the 100 experiments as a cumulative distribution function. We see that simple tabulation and the 5-independent schemes remain tightly concentrated while the multiplication-shift schemes have significant variance, as observed also in Thorup and Zhang [2012] . This behavior is repeated in the timings on the two computers, but shifted due to difference in speed for the hash computations.
Thus, among simple fast hashing schemes, simple tabulation stands out in not failing on a dense interval. Of course, it might be that simple tabulation had a different worst-case input. A plausible guess is that the worst instance of simple tabulation is the hypercube, which minimizes the amount of random table entries used. In our case, for 2 20 keys, we experimented with the set [32] , 4 that is, we only use 32 values for each of the 4 characters. The results for the number of probes are presented in Figure 3 . A notable competitor to simple tabulation is a tailor-made tabulation hash function analyzed by Dietzfelbinger and Woelfel [2003] . This function uses two arrays of size r and four d-independent hash functions to obtain failure probability n/r d/2 .
Let us analyze the parameters needed in a practical implementation. If we want the same space as in simple tabulation, we can set r = 2 10 (this is larger than = 256, because fewer tables are needed). For a nontrivial failure probability with sets of 2 20 keys, this would require 6-independence. In principle, the tabulation-based scheme of Thorup and Zhang [2012] can support 6-independence with 5c−4 tables (and lookups). This scheme has not been implemented yet, but based on combinatorial complexity is expected to be at least twice as slow as the 5-independent scheme tested in Table I (i.e., 4-8 times slower than simple tabulation). Alternatively, we can compute four 6-independent hash functions using two polynomials of degree 5 on 64-bit values (e.g. modulo 2 61 − 1). Based on Table I , this would be two orders of magnitude slower than simple tabulation. With any of the alternatives, the tailor-made scheme is much more complicated to implement.
APPENDIX
We will here formally establish that the standard Chernoff bounds hold if when each variable have a fixed mean even if the of the variables are not independent. Below we shall use the notation that if we have variables x 1 , x 2 , ..., then x <i = {x j } j<i . In particular,
x <i = j<i x j . PROPOSITION 1. Consider n possibly dependent random variables X 1 , X 2 , . . . , X n ∈ [0, 1]. Suppose for each i that E[X i ] = μ i is fixed no matter the values of X 1 , ..., X i−1 , that is, for any values x 1 , ..., x i−1 , E[X i |X <i = x <i ] = μ i . Let X = i X i and μ = E[X ] = i μ i . Then for any δ > 0, the bounds are:
The proof is a simple generalization over the standard proof when the X i are independent. We wish to bound the probability of X ≥ (1 + δ)μ. To do this, we will prove that
The proof will be by induction on n. Let
Pr[X <n = x <n ] × (1 + δ) x <n × E (1 + δ) X n | X <n = x <n . Now, for any random variable Y ∈ [0, 1], by convexity,
Therefore, since E[X n |X <n = x <n ] = μ n for any value x <n of X <n , E (1 + δ) X n | X <n = x <n ≤ e δμ n .
Thus,
Pr[X <n = x <n ] × (1 + δ) x <n × e δμ n = E (1 + δ) X <n × e δμ n ≤ e δ μ <n × e δμ n = e δμ .
The last inequality followed by induction. Finally, by Markov's inequality, we conclude that
The case X ≤ (1 − δ)μ follows by a symmetric argument.
